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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Widespread farmland ownership by large external investors in Western Canada is perceived by 
many to have the potential to significantly affect farm structure. While mostly speculation to 
date, the potential effects of farmland ownership changes on Prairie agriculture are not well 
understood. In fact, there are sound financial reasons for institutional investors to want to 
purchase farmland as an investment, including diversification benefits available for investment 
portfolios. Previous studies have found that the correlation between farmland prices and those of 
major financial assets such as stocks, bonds and real estate are consistently negative.  
 
In contrast, the long-standing objective of many farm family businesses is “to maintain control 
and pass on a secure and sound business to the next generation” (Hay and Morris 1984; 
Errington 2002). In Western Canada, farmland has been typically retained within a family by the 
process of succession, a situation in turn driven by strong personal and economic linkages. These 
linkages often create a situation where it can be difficult for retiring farmers to make objective 
decisions about the future of their land assets. While a very important issue with respect to future 
farm structure, in fact very little prior research has examined the long-term consequences of a 
more open sales or succession option for farmland in the region.  
 
Due to the complexity and heterogeneity of these individual land decisions, I offer that an agent 
based simulation model (ABSM) framework is the best modeling approach to help shed light on 
this issue. The ABSM developed in this study builds directly upon Anderson’s (2012) prior 
simulation of farm activity within Canadian Agricultural Region (CAR) 1A in the province of 
Saskatchewan. In effect, two detailed computational modules applied to that simulation 
framework were developed for this thesis. These modules capture both farm succession as well 
as the presence of institutional investors who are able to purchase Prarie farmland as a financial 
asset.  
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In the thesis, thirty years of future farming and investment performance are simulated for 
hundreds of farmers across four different scenarios. The simulation results help me estimate the 
potential effects of various levels of institutional investor participation on regional farm 
structure.  
 
In sum, I find that institutional investors elevate farmland prices in the region from between 
approximately 15% to 40% across the scenarios. As a response to this, farmers will tend to lease 
more land over time to support their farming land base. I also find that the total number of farms 
in the region falls over time, while simultaneously larger individual farms form through the 
duration of the simulation. The latter occurs either with or without the presence of institutional 
investors. Based on my simulation findings, I conclude that the potential overall impact of 
institutional investors on future farm structure in the region could be significant, but will 
manifest in very subtle ways. Most critically, farming success with institutional investors 
operating in this land market is contingent on future farmers being willing to rely on land rental 
rather than ownership for the process of farm expansion.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Introduction and Background 
Historically, one of the key objectives of a farm family business has been “to maintain control and 
pass on a secure and sound business to the next generation” (Hay and Morris 1984, Errington 
2002). In this context, farm succession is an important part of any agricultural policy for future 
farming (Fennell, 1981). When farmers age, a gradual decline of the physical labor and 
management capacity pushes senior farmers to exit farming (Kimhia and Bollman 1999), but the 
transition to a younger generation is not as easy.  
 
According to the Farmland Value Report (2012), farmland value in Saskatchewan doubled from 
2008 to 2012. In the pursuit of greater efficiency and higher management returns, increasing farm 
size has led to higher level of farm debt, leading to higher financial leverage and potentially greater 
vulnerability to business adversity.  
 
This problem is further exacerbated by the ubiquitous goal of farm expansion by farmland 
purchase instead of leasing, leading to further increased farm debt. Hence, the question of who 
finances farm expansion is critical. An alternative solution is to encourage expanding farmers to 
rent more land instead of purchasing. Moreover, the retired farmers might also hold their farmland 
for more capital to fund their retirement plans. 
 
Bringing in capital outside of agriculture, buying farmland and renting it back to farmers may seem 
to be an obvious solution. Back in 1971, the Saskatchewan government purchased approximately 
1.2 million acres from retiring farmers and leased it back to beginning farmers. This purchase was 
known as land banking (Evans, 2004). Another alternative is to allow ownership by outside 
investors. There are various motivations for investors to buy and hold farmland, for example, 1) 
higher food prices caused by population growth, 2) farmland scarcity (Byerlee and Deininger 2014) 
and 3) the low correlation between farmland and other assets (Painter and Eves 2008).  
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There has been a tradition of strict regulation about which and how much land non-farmers can 
own in Saskatchewan (Ferguson, Furtan and Carlberg, 2006). For example, the current legislation 
forbids pension plans and investment trust and limits foreign farmland ownership. However, the 
merits of farmland investment have driven off-farm investors to own Saskatchewan farmland. For 
example, as of 2013, three major farmland investing entities: Agcapita, Assiniboia and Bonnefield 
own 175,000 acres of land worth $452 million in Saskatchewan (Bell 2014). According to 
Desmarais et al (2016), 1.44% of Saskatchewan farmland was owned by non-farming entities, but 
this ratio was merely 0.09% in the year 2002.  
 
The impact of widespread farm ownership by external investors is uncertain. It is likely that in a 
free market, there increased demand for farmland could drive prices up. Retired farmers receive 
greater revenue from increased farmland prices. Expanding farmers, however, will purchase less 
land and rely more on rental land than before. However, leased land is not perceived to be as 
financially secure as owned land. In addition, farmers will forgo any capital gains from farmland 
price appreciation by renting farmland. As a result, the effects on farmer wealth are somewhat 
ambiguous. The efficiency of rental markets may also have unintended knock-on or cascading 
effects on farm structure, farm succession, and agricultural commodity prices. To start this thesis, 
we need to review farmland ownership regulations carefully. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
If large institutional farmland ownership is allowed, three problems arise regarding its effects on, 
1) farmland purchase prices and rent, 2) farm succession and 3) long-run farm structure. 
These are crucial problems that policy makers must address before considering changes to farm 
ownership laws. 
 
1.2 Objectives  
The primary aims of this study are, 1) to identify the dynamic processes associated with farm 
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succession and farmland investment by institutional investors and 2) to assess the long-run impact 
of farmland succession behavior and off-farm ownership on the long-run structure of 
Saskatchewan farms under alternative investor purchasing scenarios. Additional objectives include 
the evaluation of the impact of institutional investor behavior on the farmland rental market, farm 
investment strategies and farm succession. 
 
1.3 Expected Results 
Key expected outcomes of this simulation analysis are as follows. 
1) We expect more frequent farmland transactions and increased farmland prices,  
2) Relative farmland rents (rent/price ratio) may drop due to a more abundant supply,  
3) Farm structure may change due to the increase in leased land and 
4) Farm succession can successfully retain the majority of farmland ownership despite the 
intervention of off-farm investors.  
 
1.4 Problem Characteristics 
The objectives of the non-farm investors are critical. In this simulation, we assume institutional 
investors are optimistic about the future value of Saskatchewan farmland, and they want to hold 
the optimal amount of farmland in a well-diversified, long-run investment portfolio.  
 
Another key to this study is the role of farm demographics on farm succession and the successful 
transition from one generation to next. Farm demographics include farm type, size and gender of 
heirs, offspring education levels and the opportunity costs of running farms.   
 
The intention for institutional investors in bidding for farmland is to increase their portfolio 
efficiency as measured by their return-risk ratio. Contrary to the objectives of most farmers, we 
assume investors consider farmland as a financial asset that yields dividends and capital gains. 
With lesser concerns about budget constraints, investors will likely compete against local 
farmers in the farmland purchasing market. Non-active farmers, such as retired farmers, might be 
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more likely to sell their farmland to institutional investors to search for a better price. However, 
farm succession effectively retains farmland within farm control. Thus, we generate complex 
interactions between institutional bidders and the process of farm succession. Moreover, it is also 
uncertain whether the introduction of outside investors will change farm structure. In the 
following chapters, we develop an agent-based simulation model to test these outcome 
hypotheses.  
 
1.5 Outline of Thesis 
There are six chapters in this thesis. The basic background to the issues raised in this research is 
in Chapter 1. Chapter Two is an overview of the relevant literature on agent-based simulation 
models (ABSM), farm succession decisions and investment in farmland. Chapter Three presents 
analytic details of succession models and investment strategies, describing agent behavior in the 
simulation. In Chapter Four, we report the data for scenario initialization and the various time 
paths used in the simulation analysis. We also conduct model verification in comparison with the 
relevant data sources to confirm that the model is a reliable representation of the farming region. 
In Chapter Five, we initially conduct the model validation based on the data from Canadian 
Agricultural Census. Then, we report and discuss the model simulation results. Finally, the last 
chapter is a summary and concludes the thesis.    
 
1.6 The Author’s Contributions 
The model in this study is inherited from Anderson (2012). In Anderson(2012)’s model, the 
behavior patterns of farmers, including crop planning, harvesting, product transporting, machinery 
adopting and bidding mechanisms in the farmland purchasing and leasing market are 
comprehensively established. In this study, the following contributions are made: 
1) Upgrade the farm succession module. In Anderson (2012)’s model, the farm succession is 
based on a fixed probability. In this study, the probability of farm succession is determined by 
the heterogeneous situations of the farm and the heirs, and every heir of each retired farmer 
will be given a unique willingness score to take over the farm, 
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2) Add the institutional investor module. In Anderson (2012)’s model, the off-farm investor is 
the “bottom feeders,” randomly buying 10% of the unsold farmland from the farmland 
purchasing auction with sellers’ reserved prices. In this study, we add three heterogeneous 
portfolio investors competing against farmers in the farmland auction, and their bidding prices 
are based on the financial value of farmland, 
3) Update the bootstrapping method. In Anderson (2012)’s model, the model inputs, such as 
the future grain prices and yields, are simulated by resampling techniques. In this study, a 
GARCH process is used to simulate the variance and covariance among different series better. 
4) Update the reporting structure. In this study, the reported results cover each type of farmers, 
and the upper and lower 5 runs for each of the four scenarios and 
5) Update the non-dynamic model inputs. The model inputs are updated to the values of 2014 
as the starting year of model simulation.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter contains an overview of the main concepts associated with farm succession 
and institutional investments in real estate and farmland. The chapter also includes an 
introduction to agent-based simulation modeling (ABSM), describing some of its 
advantages over standard economic methods used in agricultural research. 
 
2.1 Farm Succession 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The economic literature has some insight into reasons for farm entry and exit. For example, 
Jovanovic (1982) maintains firms exit because their efficiency is comparatively lower than 
their competitors. Family farms can be independent companies. As a family operation, old 
farmers typically exit farming when they are no longer as efficient as they were when 
younger. However, contrary to many other types of firms in an economy, intergenerational 
farm transfer is the premise for the sustainability of the agricultural business (Uchiyama, 
Lobley, Errington and Yanagimura 2005) 
 
More recent studies concentrate on the following aspects of farm transfer: 1) successors’ 
motivation to take over the “reins of business”, 2) measures to encourage early 
identification of successors, including the development of plans for “handing over the 
business”, and 3) measures to reduce the apparent barriers to retirement (Lobley, Baker, 
Whitehead 2010). In the following sections, we review the studies the incentives, 
motivations and the likelihood of successful farm succession. 
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2.1.2 Farm Succession Incentives 
2.1.2.1 Risk Sharing 
We consider family farms as a form of intergenerational risk sharing process. Lotlikoff 
and Spivak (1981) point out that interfamily transfer enables the extended family to enjoy 
the benefits of intergenerational risk-sharing when the annuity market is imperfect. 
Wealth transfer from parents to children shares risks within families. Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (1985) utilize a three-year panel data of 2900 Indian rural farms (1968 to 1971), 
finding that farmland-related experience could make for optimal interfamily succession. 
They also valued intergenerational farm transfers and joint production in implicit 
intergenerational contracts.  
 
2.1.2.2 Transaction Costs Reduction 
Farm succession can also contribute to reductions in overall transaction costs. Labard and 
Lentz (1983) assume that individuals have “soil-specific human capital” in their thorough 
understanding. Individuals discover the intimate knowledge of farmland, such as how the 
land responds to different weather and agricultural conditions, and this information can 
transfer to the next generation with minimum costs. Due to the existence of transaction 
costs, revealing true land value and transferring specific knowledge to an outsider is costly. 
Thus, they conclude that farm succession is motivated primarily by the transfer of farm-
specific human capital from fathers to heirs and other children inside the farm. 
 
Pesquin, Kimhi and Kislev (1998) also report a similar conclusion based on farm 
simulations. They discover that compared with hiring labor outside the family, family 
members are more efficient because they grow up on the farm and know their farms better 
than outsiders. The effect of “smoothing” the transaction, along with tax shields, are still 
major motivations for farm succession. 
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2.1.2.3 Cultural and Ethical Effects 
Farm culture is a factor in succession planning. Barclay, Foskey and Reeve (2007) study 
the case of Australia. They claim that traditional Anglo-Saxon approaches to asset 
succession and inheritance that prefer a male successor to continue the family farm 
business have a strong impact on farm ideology and attitude. Nominating a male successor 
is the custom. Moreover, Kimhi (2004) analyzes the data from Israel and concludes that 
children from Asia or Africa are more likely to have off-farm employment. Moreover, 
various cultural backgrounds might have different influences on the attitudes on education, 
and a high level of education of the heirs decreases the probability of succession. 
 
2.1.3 Determinants of Farm Succession 
Studies found that female heirs are often viewed less favorably than male heirs (Stiglbauer 
and Weiss, 1999, Kazakopoulos, Arachoviti and Papadopoulos, 2000). In addition, other 
factors may also impact on farm succession decisions: 1) farm size, 2) farm type, 3) farmer 
age, 4) education of operators and heirs. 
 
2.1.3.1 Farm Size 
It is likely that a larger farm size increases the probability of successful family succession. 
Blanc and Perrier-Cornet (1993) utilize a dataset from 12 European countries from 1988 to 
1989. They find that when the farm size is larger than a critical level, it is more common 
for the farm to have a successor. Barclay, Foskey and Reeve (2007) reach the same result 
with data from Australia. They argue that farms with smaller size cannot support two 
generations. Thus, children from small farms have to find off-farm employment and have 
less land-specific experiences than those who come from large farms. As a result, they will 
be less likely to take over the family farms. Potter and Lobley (2007), Mishra, Johnson and 
Morehart (2003), Mishra (2003), Glauben, Tietje, Weiss (2006) and Uchiyama, Lobley, 
Errington, Yanagimura (2005) also draw the same conclusions.  
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2.1.3.2 Farm type 
Due to distinct managing, laboring and financial requirements for producing different 
products, farm type also plays a major role in succession (El-Osta and Johnson, 2004). 
Dairy, fruit and vegetable farms require higher levels of managing and operating skills. 
Thus, these farms are more likely to have successors. Potter and Lobley (2007), Glauben, 
Tietje, Weiss (2006), Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001) and Corsi (2006) also confirm this 
finding. 
 
2.1.3.3 Farmer Age 
Farmer age and possible successful transferring could share a non-linear, or U-shaped 
relationship. As a result, there might be an optimal age to consider farm succession. Laband 
and Lentz (1983) initially report a non-linear relationship when testing the data in 1962 
from the U.S. Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001), Glauben, Tietje, Weiss (2006), Barclay, Foskey 
and Reeve (2007) and Ellinger, Barnard and Wilson (2007) support this finding. Kimhi 
(1994) explains this non-linear relationship. As the age of the farm operator increases, 
he/she will eventually become more aware of the need for succession. On the other hand, 
if a farmer delays to consider farm succession, his/her children could have to find off-farm 
occupations. As a result, the chance for succession will be smaller as the farmer get old. 
 
2.1.3.4 Education Level of Operators and Heirs 
Regarding farm operators, Lamband and Lentz (1983) argue there is no significant impact 
of educational level on farm succession. However, some other studies claim that a higher 
level of education for either farmers or successors will discourage farm succession. For 
example, Kimhi (1994) asserts that farm operators with a higher level of education will 
allow the children to have more time and flexibility to consider their future career options. 
Mishra, El-Osta and Shaik (2010) point out that once the potential successor has 
accomplished high school or college, the probability for him/her to take over the family 
farm will drop by about ten percent. They further claim that farmers with university degrees 
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pay more attention to their children’s education. As a result, any potential successors on 
these farms might prefer not to take over the family farms because of high opportunity 
costs. The findings of Glauben, Tietje and Weiss (2006) and Corsi (2007) also support this 
argument. 
 
Several other studies, however, come to opposing conclusions on this issue. Stiglbauer and 
Weiss (1999), Hennessy and Rehman (2008) and Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001) claim that 
high education level increases the probability of succession. They believe that better-
educated parents can prepare for succession more efficiently, thereby allowing themselves 
to make an earlier and better decision.  
 
As for the education level of heirs, studies tend to agree that a higher educational attainment 
for potential successors increases the opportunity cost of taking over the family farms, thus 
decreasing the possibility of succession (for example, Kimhi (1994) and Hennessy and 
Rehman (2008)). 
 
2.1.4 Summary 
Transaction costs and risk sharing are critical determinants for farm succession. The 
relationship of tradition and culture is also important. To determine the probability of 
making successful succession plans, researchers should consider the gender, education, and 
age of the successor, as well as farm type and size. In conclusion, succession is more likely 
to take place when the farms are profitable and require more focused and specific managing 
and operating skills. Furthermore, the chance of successful farm successions increases 
when the successors have lower opportunity costs. Meanwhile, those who have lower 
education level or more experience in farming are more likely to take over the family farms. 
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2.2 Non-Farm Investors: Institutional Investors 
2.2.1 Introduction 
From a financial market and portfolio creation perspective, the work of Markowitz 
(1952) was the first that formulated the choice of optimal investment portfolios based on 
the concepts of expected returns (E) and returns variation (V). The efficient portfolio is 
the portfolio that has the property that “no portfolio can have either a smaller V (with the 
same or greater E) or higher E with the same or smaller V.”  
 
Many studies have noted that the addition of farmland could be helpful to improve the 
efficiency of a given portfolio (Speidell, 1990) because of its stable rate of return (Lins, 
Sherrick and Venigalla, 1992) as well as the benefits of risk diversification (Kaplan, 1985, 
Painter, 2005, Painter, 2008). The following sections contain the basic theory of “E-V” 
analysis and a review of investment in both real estate and farmland. 
 
2.2.2 Theoretical Background on Institutional Investors: Asset Pricing Theories and 
Valuation  
2.2.2.1 Markowitz’s Portfolio Selection Theory 
Markowitz (1952) introduced the concept of the efficient portfolio as a bundle of risky 
assets in his E-V analysis. Let: 
R =∑𝑅𝑖𝑋𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(2.1) 
Where:     R = the weighted average return of all securities, 
                 𝑅𝑖= the return of security i and 
                 𝑋𝑖 = the relative amount invested in security i. 
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By assumption,  ∑ 𝑋𝑖 = 1 and no short selling is allowed. Then we have the expected 
return E, written as, 
E =∑𝑋𝑖𝜇𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(2.2) 
Moreover, its variance is: 
  
V =∑∑𝜎𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑋𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
(2.3) 
 
Thus, for any attainable portfolio, we always have a combination of (E, V). Following 
Markowitz (1952), portfolio X is efficient if and only if no other portfolios with the same 
V have a greater E, or conversely that no other portfolios with the same E have a greater 
V.  
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Figure 2.1: Efficient E-V combination, Markowitz (1952), p.82 
 
 
To increase the efficiency of the portfolio with a targeted expected return, a rational 
investor needs to decrease the covariance of different securities in the portfolios. 
 
2.2.2.2 Tobin’s Two-Phase Portfolio Selection and Risk Preference Theory 
Tobin (1958) adds risk preference and risk-free assets into Markowitz’s model. He argued 
that regarding investment choices, there are two phases. The first phase is the selection of 
a combination of risky assets, while in the second phase, the investor adds a risk-free asset 
into that mix. 
 
Tobin’s other contribution is the application of preference theory from economics to help 
understand an investor’s personal attitude toward risks. He pointed out that we can use the 
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notion of utility and risk present in indifference analysis to distinguish investors by 
categories of either risk loving, risk-averting or risk neutral investors. Namely, to maximize 
utility, risk-averting investors have upward indifference curves in EV space, while risk-
loving investors have negatively sloped indifference curves. 
 
2.2.2.3 Sharpe’s Capital Market Line and Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Sharpe (1960) followed Tobin’s work and derived the Capital Market Line (CML). 
 
Figure 2.2: The EV Portfolio and the CML (Capital Market Line), Sharpe (1964), p. 426 
 
From Figure 2.2, investors only hold risk-free assets to earn a risk-free rate. Each point on 
the CML and its extension is the optimal combination. Thus, there is no attainable portfolio 
with the same E and a lower V or with the same V and a higher E lying outside the CML. 
Figure 2.3 is employed to demonstrate the mapping of optimal investments. 
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Figure 2.3: Portfolio Selection with Risk Preference, Sharpe (1964), p. 429 
 
In Figure 2.3 the most efficient allocation of portfolio selection is always the tangent point 
between the CML and each set of indifference curves, namely A*, φ and C*. 
 
Moreover, Sharpe (1964) argues that there are two types of risks to be considered, 
systematic risks and unsystematic risks. The correlation between expected return and 
systematic risks is straightforward, but unsystematic risk receives no compensation. Using 
this principle, Sharpe developed the so-called capital asset pricing model (CAPM): 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) 
(2.4) 
𝛽𝑖 = 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑚)
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑅𝑚)
 
(2.5) 
 Where:   𝐸(𝑅𝑖) is the expected return of asset i, 
                𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 
                𝑅𝑚is the expected return of the market and 
                𝛽𝑖 is the sensitivity between market return and return on individual asset i. 
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There are alternative asset pricing strategies such as arbitrage pricing theory (APT). Ross 
(1976) proposes APT and believes if there are no arbitrage opportunities in the equilibrium 
price, the expected return and the “factor loadings,” i.e. the risks, share a linear relation. 
Huberman and Wang (2001) claim that the limited arbitraging capacity and dynamic 
portfolio investment leads to the failure of APT. In this study, the illiquidity nature of 
farmland restrains arbitrage, and the investor agents in the model manage dynamic 
portfolios. However, CAPM is the better and most parsimonious model relevant to the 
research question than APT. 
 
In the following chapters, we will apply CAPM to farmland investment and pricing for our 
institutional farmland investors.  
 
2.2.2.4 Application to portfolio construction  
According to E-V analysis, Painter (2013) finds that to achieve minimum variance with a 
given expected return, we need to: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑋′𝑄𝑋 
Subject to: 
𝑅𝑝 = 𝐶′𝑋 
W =  e’X 
(2.6) 
Where   X is the vector of the wealth share invested in each asset, 
             Q is the variance-covariance matrix of asset returns, 
             𝑅𝑝 is the weighted expected return on assets, 
             C is the matrix of returns on each individual return, 
             W is a singleton 1 and 
              E is a N×1 vector of 1. 
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2.2.2.5 Section Summary 
This section introduced classical theories of investment portfolio selection, risk preferences 
and CAPM. In the following chapter describing the simulation parameters, we calculate 
the reserved bidding price for non-farm investors following this method. In the simulation 
model, CAPM comprises the decision rule for investors to help determine their bidding 
price for farmland. 
 
2.2.3 Real Estate Investments 
2.2.3.1 Introduction 
DeLisle (2002) points out that real estate is a distinct asset class that has some implications 
for asset allocation, portfolio construction and portfolio management. Webb, Curcio and 
Rubens (1988) analyze the data from 1947 to 1983 over successive periods. They construct 
six portfolios with different assets and conclude that the optimal portfolio contains 2/3 real 
estate and 1/3 other financial assets. They further claim real estate is very effective in risk 
diversification.  
 
Fisher and Sirmans (1994) argue that although investment in the land might not be 
attractive because of low historical returns, the low correlation between housing and debt 
or stock makes it become an excellent diversifying asset. Kaiser (1999) analyzes the data 
from 1951-97 from the U.S. and concludes that real property can reduce the standard 
deviation of both the bond/stock mix and the return/risk ratio. Thus, bond/property 
combinations seem to have superiority over a single asset approach. Lu and Mei (1999) 
and Corgel and DeRoots (1999) also reach the same conclusion. 
 
Alternatively, the effect of inflation hedging of real estate is still ambiguous. Ibbotson and 
Siegel (1984) and Hoesli (1994) indicate that housing is an “excellent” inflation hedge with 
almost non-beta risks. On the other hand, some other studies hold the belief that real estate 
return and inflation share positive correlation, such as Gatzlaff (1994), Stevenson and 
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Murry (1999) and Onder (2000). 
 
In some real estate studies, the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) is used as a benchmark. 
Following Giliberto (1993), REIT is a capitalization-weighted index that provides 
investors with the opportunity to own a share of real estate. Moreover, there are two types 
of REIT, mortgage REITs which lend mortgage to property owners, and equity REITs that 
collect rent from owned property (Titman and Waege, 1986).  
 
Miles and McCue (1982) find low risk and low return features of REIT due to passive 
management. However, they also find real estate is a useful financial vehicle for risk 
diversification. Liang and McIntosh (1998) analyze data from 1984 to 1997 and point out 
that equity REIT outperforms the market over the last four sample years. Regard its use as 
an inflation hedge, Gyourko and Siegel (1994) conclude that REIT has a low correlation 
with inflation, thus providing effective protection against inflation. 
 
2.2.3.2 Institutional Investment in Farmland 
Farmland is a subcategory of real estate. Ibbotson and Fall (1979), Ibbotson and Siegel 
(1984), Painter (2000) and Painter (2008) argue that farmland can be used to diversify the 
risks of an investment portfolio and hedge inflation risks. They also find that farmland 
sometimes outperforms regular residential and commercial real estate.  
 
To this end, Ibbotson and Fall (1979) divide properties into two groups, farmland and 
housing. With their data from 1974 to 1978, they find both houses and farmland performed 
extremely well, with almost zero betas. Moreover, farmland does a little better than housing 
based over this period. Ibbotson and Siegel (1984) investigate data from 1947 to 1982 from 
the U.S. They find farmland is better than residential housing. More recently, Hardin and 
Cheng (2005) apply a mean-semi variance approach1 to calculate the lower partial moment 
                                                 
1 Mean – semivariance is a “linearized” version of LP that uses simple, unsquared deviations from a mean a 
criterion.  
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as the minimum required return of the investors. When taking farmland into the simulated 
portfolio, they assert that farmland is as equally risk-efficient as real estate. 
 
Following Farbairn (2014) and Gunnoe (2004), we define institutional investors to include 
pension funds, hedge funds, university endowments, private foundations, life insurance 
companies and sovereign wealth funds. Wheaton and Kiernan (2012) estimate that total 
institutional investments in farmland are between total $30 – 40 billion globally, or about 
1% of the total volume of investment. Although farmland is now considered a good 
alternative in real estate investment Carter 2010)2, historically, it was never considered as 
a financial asset candidate until about 1980 when Barry (1980) included U.S. farmland as 
a risky asset into a potential investment portfolio. National or regional farmland contribute 
little to systematic risk and its non-systematic risk can be readily derived based on the 
theory of Sharpe (1964) that non-systematic risk can be eliminated by asset diversification. 
It is critical because the purpose for institutional investors to buy and hold Saskatchewan 
farmland is to diversify their portfolio to reach CML. 
 
Kaplan (1985) examined long-term correlations between farm real estate and stock, 
corporate bonds, government bonds and US Treasury bills. He found that farmland is 
positively correlated only with Treasury bills. Moss, Featherstone and Baker (1987) 
applied E-V analysis on a portfolio including US farm assets, and they report that the 
historical risk-return relationship of agricultural assets makes them attractive for nonfarm 
investors to hold. Irwin, Forster and Sherrick (1988), Lins, Sherrick and Venigalla (1992), 
Lins, Kowalski and Hoffman (1992) and Bjornson and Innes (1992) come to the same 
conclusion. Finally, Bjornson and Innes indicate that farmland is also a good hedge toward 
uncertain inflation.  
 
                                                 
2  Carter maintains that farm real estate has gone through a “financialization” process (where profit is 
generated from financial rather than productive channel nowadays, 
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Shiha and Chavas (1995) and Webb (1995) identify ownership regulation as a potential 
barrier to external investment funds entering farmland markets. Hence, a more relaxed 
regulation system could encourage more non-farm investment in agricultural land. 
Moreover, both farmers and non-farmers should exploit both markets as Oltmans (2007) 
points out: both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors should bilaterally hold assets 
on the other side. Following this reasoning, Harvey (1982) argues that farmland can 
become an important form of interest-bearing capital rather than an element of production.  
 
Regarding farmland in Canada, Painter (2002) argued that farmland in Saskatchewan is an 
excellent hedge tool against inflation. Using E-V analysis, Painter (2002) also finds 
farmland has low risks, high dividends and lower returns. Moreover, being related to 
similar studies in the U.S., he also reports that the correlation between Saskatchewan 
farmland and other assets is negative. Painter (2008) regards Canadian farmland as a lower 
risk category than stocks with a lower investment yield. Moreover, seemingly overpriced 
farmland is not overpriced when prices for other farm assets are expected to increase. He 
concludes that land prices in Western Canada might eventually rise because of upcoming 
non-farm premia.  
 
Painter (2010), in a subsequent study, discovered additional evidence, asserting that capital 
market gain and risks associated with farmland are lower than stocks. Contrary to the 
findings of Harding and Cheng (2005), he suggests that portfolios for median risk-median 
return performance would be better off after adding farmland.  
 
Painter (2010) also recommends that international portfolio investors hold Canadian 
farmland. From this perspective, Painter (2011) compares Canadian farmland with gold 
and oil. He argues that farmland was almost as good as gold at improving the efficiency of 
portfolios at medium risk. Painter (2013) also finds that farmland investments offer 
protection against inflation and stable annual dividends. 
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2.2.3.3 Summary of the Effectiveness of Real Estate and Farmland in Investment 
Portfolios 
Based on these prior studies, real estate provides at least two benefits to investment 
portfolios: 1) low or negative correlation with most other assets, 2) low risk and more stable 
returns. Moreover, the previous research not only shows that farmland shares the same 
merits for investment purposes, but also outperforms commercial and residential real estate 
in some aspects.  
 
2.3 Non-Farm Ownership and Farmland Ownership Regulations in Saskatchewan 
2.3.1 Ownership Regulation in Saskatchewan 
The Saskatchewan Farm Security Act (FSA) was updated in 2002. It is the current active 
farmland ownership law in the province of Saskatchewan. It indicates that “only Canadian 
residents and 100 percent Canadian-owned entities are allowed to own more than 10 acres 
of Saskatchewan farmland”. This is the so-called “10 acre” rule. Moreover “Canadian-
owned entities” are defined explicitly, meaning that at present, investment trusts and 
pension plans are not allowed to purchase Saskatchewan farmland.   
 
FSA was originated from The Saskatchewan Farm Ownership Act back to 1974. The 
purpose of that act was to give way to local agricultural industry and support the 
development of rural areas. Amendments to the original Act took place in 1980 and 1988. 
In 1988, the Saskatchewan Farm Security Act replaced the Saskatchewan Farm Ownership 
Act, combining home quarter protection provisions originated in the 1930s with other 
changes. An overview of these detailed rules are as follows: 
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Table 2.1: Current and Historical Farmland Ownership Regulations in Saskatchewan 
1974 1977 1980 1988 2002
Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited
$15,000 160 Acres 160 Acres 10 Acres Unlimited
$15,000 160 Acres 160 Acres 10 Acres 10 Acres
Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited
160 Acres 160 Acres 10 Acres 320 Acres Unlimited
160 Acres 160 Acres 10 Acres 10 Acres Unlimited
$15,000 160 Acres 10 Acres 10 Acres 10 Acres
Canadian Agricultural 
Saskatchewan Non-Agricultural
Other Canadian Non-Agricultural
Non-Canadian Companies
Owner Identity
Year
Individuals
Companies
Saskatchewan Residents
Other Canadian Residents
Non-Canadian Residents
 
(Source: Carlberg, Furtan and Moss (2003), p. 395) 
The 2002 amendment removes the restrictions for both Canadian residents and 100% 
Canadian owned companies (not public traded). The current act seems to relax ownership 
restrictions on Canadian residents and Canadian commercial entities. However, there are 
more precautions built in based on perceived foreign threats on farmland security. 
 
Table 2.2 shows a comparison of current farmland ownership limitation in all provinces. It 
is clear that except for acreage differences, most of the provinces share at least some 
restrictions on foreign ownership. That might imply land authorities prefer to smooth 
farmland values and otherwise protect against price disturbances potentially caused by 
large-scale (international) land purchases. 
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Table 2.2: Provincial Comparison in Farmland Ownership Restriction 
Saskatche
wan
Alberta B.C. Manitoba Ontario
Prince 
Edward 
Island
Quebec
Residents 10 acres 20 acres 40 acres 5 acres 10 acres
Cooperation 10 acres 20 acres 40 acres 5 acres 10 acres
Canadian Pension 
Plan
Not 
Allowed
Allowed Allowed
Not 
Allowed
Allowed Allowed Allowed
Province
International 
Investor Identity
No 
Restrictio
n
No 
Restrictio
n
 
(Source: Government of Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Farmland Ownership) 
2.3.2 Effect of Land Ownership Regulations 
2.3.2.1 Effect of Land Ownership Regulation on Farmland Price 
Farmland ownership in Saskatchewan faces certain restrictions, but the effect of the 
Saskatchewan Farm Ownership Act on farmland price is still ambiguous. For example, 
Halt (1979) and Harris and Raviv (1981) studied the pricing effects of the Act using a 
sealed bidding scenario and discovered that increased competitiveness raises the tender 
land price. Brannman, Klein and Weiss (1987) found that when bidding on a fixed asset 
with an uncertain value such as farmland, adding one more bidder will push the bid value 
of the winning bidder in proportion to (1/number of bidders), essentially to avoid a winner’s 
curse3. Consequently, ownership barriers likely decreases farmland prices.  
Moss and Schmitz (2008) using 1952 to 1999 data offer that there is no indication that the 
FSA led to Saskatchewan farmland price decreases. They believe this is a likely story 
because Saskatchewan residents “bid away all possible future land rents” without any 
credit constraints. Ferguson, Furtan and Carlberg (2006) reach a similar empirical result. 
Using a simple OLS model and 1951 to 2002 Saskatchewan farmland prices, they found 
that that a 1% increase in the stringency of the ownership regulation reduced Saskatchewan 
                                                 
3 Following Thaler (1988), there are two descriptions about winner's curse. 1) the winning bid is higher than 
the true value of the tract and the winner loses money, and 2) the winner is disappointed because the winning 
bid is higher than the expert-estimated value of the track. 
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farmland values by 2.87%. However, as indicated in Table 2.2, off-farm investors are likely 
to bid a higher price in a farmland auction for a variety of reasons.  
 
2.3.2.2 Effect of Land Ownership Regulation on Non-farm Ownership 
Desmarais, Qualman, Magnan, and Wiebe (2015) gathered farmland ownership data for 
three small towns in Saskatchewan and identified a dramatic increase in external investor 
ownership of farmland in the regions. The average proportion of farmland holding by 
investors is more than ten percent of the total. In effect, the benefits of growing farmland 
values might be offset or reversed by these so-called “barbarians at the gate.” In the study 
of Desmarais et al. (2016), the dramatic increase of the amount of investor-owned farmland 
is revealed at the provincial level. They point out that the 2002 FSA removes the 
restrictions of Canadian individuals and cooperatives to own Saskatchewan farmland, and 
in the middle of 2014, 1.44% of the total farmland in Saskatchewan have been owned by 
non-farming entities, yet the proportion was 0.09% in 2002. Furthermore, Desmarais et al. 
(2016) observe a concentrating trend for non-farm land ownership. In 2014, the four largest 
private landowners had about 57% of the non-farm owned land. Finally, they also point 
out that the interviewed farmers concern about the rising farmland price will be a barrier 
for the young farmers, but the retired farmers might enjoy better retirement package for 
land sales. 
2.3.3 Summary 
The last 50 years has witnessed stricter ownership regulations of Saskatchewan farmland. 
While finally adopting farmland ownership restrictions similar to adjacent provinces as of 
2002, Saskatchewan is still the most conservative province regarding foreign farmland 
ownership in terms of acreage allowed as well as the prohibition of pension plan 
ownership.  However, with the introduction and growth of off-farm investors, the original 
purpose of the farmland ownership acts of controlling provincial farmland prices by 
banning or limiting farmland ownership, is starting to come apart. While a few studies 
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provide evidence and support for increased external investor ownership of farmland, this 
research will look into simulating real changes to the FSA within subsequent chapters. 
 
2.4 Models of Long-run Structural Change and Land Use 
2.4.1 Agent-Based Models and Agents 
Driven by the desire to better explore inherently complex economic systems, applications 
of agent based modeling (ABM) within the field of economics has become more and 
more popular for policy-based research (Parker and Filatova, 2008). Agent-based models 
are effective “the computational study of systems of interacting autonomous entities, each 
with dynamic behavior and heterogeneous characteristics” within an artificial world 
(Heckbert, Baynes and Reeson, 2010). The researchers, like those who conduct scientific 
experiments, are observers and must interpret the output created by the simulated agents. 
Every ABM ideally builds complex interactions between agents and their operating 
environment, as well as representing complex behavioral patterns, while providing 
valuable information about the working of real-world systems (Bonabeau, 2002). 
 
Agents, as the basic building blocks or objects in an ABM, are defined by Verburg, 
Schot, Dijst and Veldkamp (2004) as real or abstract entities that can act on themselves 
and their environment, communicating with other agents and whose behavior is the result 
of observation. As a first step, modelers must construct agents first in the process of 
building a “bottom up” virtual system or economy. Agents can be participants in 
economic activities, such as farmers, speculators, and institutional investors, or 
alternatively represent various decision-making entities in other social and environmental 
phenomena, such as market auctioneers (Farber, 1999, Tesfatsion, 2002). Agents may 
nest their own individual behavioral paradigms in interacting with the operating 
environment and other agents. Overall, the behavior of the whole simulated system 
depends on the aggregated individual behavior of each agent. (Mattews, et.al , 2007) 
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As a whole, in contrast to traditional economic models that are macroscopic in 
perspective, ABM is a microscopic modeling technique that recreates real-world or 
macro level complexity from the interacting behavior of individual participants 
(Bonabeau, 2002).  
 
2.4.2 Existing Problems with Conventional Models 
“I should, I think, be prepared to argue that, in a world ruled by uncertainty with an 
uncertain future linked to an actual present, a final position of equilibrium, such as one 
deals with in static economics, does not properly exist.” 
- -John Keynes in a letter to H. D. Henderson 
 
Tesfatsion (2006), Marks (2006) and Fagiolo, Moneta and Windrum (2007) point out that 
traditional mathematical economic general equilibrium models are constructed using the 
problematic assumption that an equilibrium always prevails in a market. In the real 
world, as Keynes speculates, economics markets are dynamic and adaptive and out of 
equilibrium with constant spikes and obstacles to stability (as cited in Arthur, 2006).   
 
Kirman (1992) argues that it is a fatal flaw to impose order on the economy through the 
concept of an omniscient individual, designed to be the “representative” individual in the 
economy, completely ignoring heterogeneity of behavior and preferences. As a result, the 
demand curve of one agent is extrapolated to represent the demand for the particular good 
of the whole economy (Tesfatsion, 2006). But for agricultural research the set of 
activities conducted by farmers are strongly influenced by the cumulative effects of 
experiences and observations of neighbor experiences (Berger, 2001).  
 
Meanwhile, Simon (1982) speculated that given the limitations of knowledge and 
computational power, people generally fail to judge whether a belief or behavior is right. 
And Williamson (1971) mused that the absence of unlimited computational capacity 
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would prevent the market from achieving optimality. However, unbounded rationality is 
one basic assumption of “rational economic man” in the theories of neoclassical 
economics (Fagiolo, Moneta and Windrum, 2007). Berger (2001) also points out two 
more flaws in conventional agricultural economic policy models. Initially, they do not 
capture the interaction between economic agents, thereby assuming there is no 
transaction and information cost, and secondly, almost never is a spatial dimension and 
the physical immobility of land ever considered as part of the individual decision process.  
 
2.4.3 Characteristics and Advantages of Agents and ABMs 
As the basic component of ABM model, agents have the following characteristics 
(summarizing the work of Tesfatsion (2006), Fagiolo, Moneta and Windrum (2007), 
Matthews et.al (2007), Heckbert, Baynes and Reeson (2010), and Crooks and 
Heppenstall (2012)),  
1. Autonomy. Agents are autonomous and free to interact with their environment in 
a dynamic fashion.  
2. Heterogeneity. Agents are equipped with different decision-making abilities, 
using both rule-based and analytical functions to represent various behavioral 
rules, competencies, rationality, or computational skills. 
3. Goal-directed. Agents are often endowed with different goals to achieve that 
ultimately guide their behavior. 
4. Adaptive bounded rationality. Agents are assumed to behave as bounded rational 
entities, possessing adaptive type expectations over past choices made by other 
agents in the population. 
5. Networked interaction. Agents are inter-dependent and follow loops of interaction 
with each other through markets, social networks and /or institutions through 
adaptive expectations.   
6. Complexity. As agent behavior is computationally complex, these models are a 
more natural way of describing the system rather than the processes. 
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Being designed with these characteristics, ABMs are therefore endowed with the 
following advantages, according to Bonabeau (2001): 
 
1. Capture emergent phenomena. When a new phenomenon emerges, the setup of 
theoretic frameworks is generally incapable of handling this. However, as a 
bottom-up method, ABMs are able to study emergent phenomena by creating a 
simulated economy with non-linear agent behaviors that can be characterized by 
thresholds, if-then rules and nonlinear coupling. 
2. Increased flexibility. ABMs can be observed by multiple dimensions since every 
result is generated endogenously, and the models are also able to reflect any 
changes to agents’ behavior descriptions and interaction rules. 
3. Better natural description of a system. ABMs create the whole systems composed 
of behavioral entities. The observers can understand every step of the system 
elevation by watching the agents and their movements.  
 
2.4.4 Application of ABMs in Agricultural Economics  
Nolan et al. (2009) highlight advantages with the application of ABMs to agricultural 
economics research, including the ability to model urban-rural fringe land use and the 
evolution of agricultural chains, measuring structural changes in farming on farmland value 
and the learning processes of farmers. Since the agent population (although synthetic) is 
the fundamental building block of an ABM, a very low level of micro-activity and the 
building blocks of a society or economy may generate a much longer forecast of 
agricultural structural change.   
 
It is not surprising that many agricultural ABMs incorporate land as a foundation (e.g., 
Verburg, Schot, Dijst and Veldkamp, 2004, Tesfatsion, 2006 and Parker et.al 2012). 
However, agent behavioral characteristics are influenced by demographics (age, marriage, 
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out-migration) and their actions are constrained by technology and markets. For example, 
Bert et al. (2011) find that farmland ownership is concentrated by fewer farms owning 
more land in their 100-year simulation. They assert that small farms cannot generate 
sufficient working capital over time, losing their ability to expand and becoming non-
competitive and shifting into rental markets. 
 
There are currently two well-known agricultural simulation models, called MP-MAS and 
Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS). MP-MAS has been updated to  MP-LUCC by 
adding climate changes to evaluate climate-related policies (Berger and Troost, 2012). 
AgriPoliS  was created by Balmann (1997) and Berger (2001). The model has been used 
to analyze agricultural issues in Chile, Ghana, Thailand, Vietnam, Uganda and Germany 
(Schreinemachers and Berger, 2011). This model includes dynamic farmer agent 
investment, crop and livestock production and consumption decisions subject to initial 
resource conditions, stochastic crop yields landscape and water resources and land and 
water market. 
 
AgriPoliS is direct descendent of MP-MAS (Schreinemachers and Berger, 2011) expanded 
to allow broader economic outcomes than just production to be assessed in agricultural 
policy analysis. In their model, farm agents who populate real landscapes (using GIS), are 
independent agents who pursue goals such as income maximization and market agents and 
are responsible for determining the demand and supply of production input and outputs 
such as farmland or grain prices. They use their model to test the interrelationship of rents, 
technical change, product prices, and the efficiency of agricultural policies (Happe, 
Balmann and Kellermann, 2004 and Happe, Kellermann and Balmain, 2006) 
 
Freeman (2005) extends these models to Saskatchewan to evaluate structural change 
(1969-2000), and also develops a land bidding market. Stolniuk (2008) improved this 
model by including livestock, economies of size and changes in land use. Anderson (2012) 
further enhanced the model by adding linear programming (LP) and mixed-integer 
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programming (MIP) decision portions (similar to AgriPoliS) into these models, and also 
introduced energy crops as a future crop choice. However, none of these models 
incorporated farmland investors as possible economic agents in Saskatchewan farmland 
markets nor either had no farmland succession or rather simplistic farmland succession. 
Thus, we update these models by adding institutional investors and more realistic farm 
succession modules. Moreover, we also improve the data bootstrapping technique used for 
generating better simulation model input. 
 
2.4.5 Repast© Symphony Platform  
Repast© Symphony Platform is a widely used free and open-source agent-based modeling 
and simulation toolkit developed by the University of Chicago using the Java language. It 
is maintained and managed by a non-profit group called ROAD (Collier, 2005, North et al. 
2006). It provides a library of objects for creating, running, displaying and collecting data 
from an agent-based simulation (Collier, 2005). Until December 2015, the latest available 
version of Repast© Symphony 2.3.1 was downloadable on 1 June 2015 (Repast© 2015). 
However, this research is derived from the work of Anderson (2012), which was written in 
Repast© Symphony 1.10. To avoid compatibility problems related to the new Windows 
64-bit system and the updated versions of Java and Repast©, this model was coded using 
Repast© Symphony 1.10. 
 
2.6 Summary 
The introduction of external investors into existing farmland markets is expected to affect 
farmland prices and have carryover effects on Saskatchewan agriculture. There is little 
precedence for the widespread entry of outside investors into western Canadian agriculture, 
and therefore statistical analyses are infeasible. Moreover, farmland prices and farm 
structure are both complex and dynamic in their interrelationship. Farm succession is an 
event founded in both culture and economics and is surely heterogeneous among modern 
farms. Because of this heterogeneity, we offer that ABM simulation is the most appropriate 
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methodology for analyzing emergent behaviors that may, in turn, lead to structural changes in 
this agricultural sector.  
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CHAPTER III: THE DUALINVESTMENT MODEL 
3.0 Introduction of the DualInvestment Model 
The DualInvestment model builds upon the prior work of Freeman (2005), Stolniuk (2008) 
and Anderson (2012). In Anderson’s (2012) model, farm agents maximize profit from both 
croplands in producing grain and marginal land in producing second generation biofuel 
plants such as willow and hybrid poplars. The farm level decision process in this latter 
model involves both long-run strategic (i.e. farm size, forage rotations and herd size) and 
short-term decision phases (annual crops). Farm succession is based on a randomized 
likelihood of retirement. With respect to farmland markets, non-farm investors, in this case, 
are essential “bottom-feeders,” and are permitted to purchase any unsold farmland where 
farmers were unable to meet the seller reservation price.  
 
DualInvestment captures two distinct types of farmland purchasers, institutional investors, 
and farmers. In turn, we introduce a more realistic mechanism in determining farm 
succession. The next chapter gives an overview of the conceptual model, followed by 
detailed discussion of 1) assumptions on operating rules for farmers, 2) farm succession 
and  transfer, 3) behavior of non-farm investors in farmland investment, 4) auction and 
bidding processes of both farmland rental and purchase markets, and 5) a chapter summary. 
 
Accordingly, the interplay of these agents in land auctions and the subsequent winning or 
losing of bids determines land ownership and rental success.  The generated ownership and 
rental patterns affect farm size, financing, survival and succession over several generations 
as well as a farm structure. Major variables we consider in the model include 1) the number 
of farmers and investors, 2) farm types, 3) farming heir education levels and opportunity 
costs of farm succession, 4) attributes of our investors, and 5) financial returns and prices 
of agricultural products. 
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3.1 Model Agents 
The DualInvestment Model simulates a regional agricultural landscape composed of 
heterogeneous farmer agents and farmland. To start, we assume that each model agent 
behaves rationally4. In the model, we consider five classifications of agents as farmland 
market participants: 1) regular farming agents, 2) farmer landlords, 3) exiting aging farmers, 
4) non-farming investors (also landlords), 5) the auctioneer agent acting as the “invisible 
hand” (Smith, 1776) to help clear farmland markets.   
 
As in Anderson (2012), the “invisible hand” of the auctioneer agent helps set farmland 
pricing by overseeing farmland auctions. The auctioneer agent is a deus ex machina agent, 
and is responsible only for the land auction, matching farmland buyers to sellers through 
the auction process. However, land auctions are influenced by the behavior of operating 
farm agents and retired farm landlords. In turn, farm agents are composed of three types: 
pure grain farm, mixed farm and pure-beef cow farms. Finally, different asset choices 
determine the heterogeneity of our non-farm investors.  
 
3.2 Model Overview and Assumptions 
The following section provides an overview of the basic assumptions as well as the 
dynamic feedback mechanisms active in the DualInvestment model. The model builds 
upon the work of Anderson (2012), with the addition of institutional farmland investors 
and farm transfer modules. The basic organizational structure of the Anderson (2012) 
model is shown in Figure 3.1. More details of the Anderson (2012) model are listed in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The (heterogeneous) landscape is based on (Census Agricultural Region) CAR 1A, located in the southeast 
corner of Saskatchewan. The landscape and farm plot details of CAR 1A will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
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Figure 3.1: An Overview of the Farmer Agent Decision Making Process (Anderson, 
2012, p.36 
 
In the DualInvestment simulation model, we make following assumptions. 
 
1. Farmland can be owned, leased or lay idle. Institutional investor landlords deliver 
the land to the rental market immediately after purchasing land.  
2. For model simplification purposes, no technological improvements are allowed 
during the simulation period, i.e., the capacity of the machinery, the expected 
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productivities and prices of grains and livestock remain the same over 30 simulating 
years. 
 
3. Both farmers and non-farm investors pursue profit maximization, subject to their 
own (risk) preferences. We assume that farmer agents are imbued with a desire to 
purchase land in striving towards maximum efficiency, but are subject to financial 
constraints, age and risk preferences. In sharp contrast, non-farm investor agents 
use farmland to build an efficient investment portfolio (sections 2.2 and 2.3). 
 
4. Each farmer has unique circumstances, risk preferences and future price 
expectations. Farmers expected future yield and commodity prices are a weighted 
average of historical values and adjusted for personal risk preferences. Non-farmer 
investor expectations are based solely on historical returns of farmland and other 
financial assets. 
 
5. Following Desmarais (2016), the four largest off-farm investors have owned 59% 
of all the non-farm owned farmland. As a result, three institutional investor agents 
representing broad classes of investors are included in the model because of the 
ownership concentration. Each investor group purchases and sells from a fixed 
number of global stock indices with no transaction fees.  
 
6. Institutional investors only buy and hold farmland for subsequent cash rental. Once 
purchased, farmland is assumed to be held indefinitely since these are assumed to 
be global investors. 
 
7. Farmers cannot invest outside the agricultural sector. 
 
8. When a farmer fails to maintain sufficient business liquidity or asset solvency, that 
agent is forced to exit.  
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9. We set the willingness for possible successors to take over their family farms using 
data from a real-world survey.  
 
10. CAPM determines the bidding value of farmland for non-farm investors (please 
refer to Section 2.2). 
 
11. Actual farm commodity prices will follow one of a series of multiple time paths. 
Farm yields are derived from stochastic yield time paths and adjusted by individual 
land productivity. 
 
12. Current tax policy continues throughout the simulated era. 
 
13. In setting auction bids, investors pay their actual bids but farmers pay the average 
of bidding price and the minimum accepted price. The latter is done in order to 
prevent “winner’s curse”5 by farmers over land purchases.  
 
Agent heterogeneity in this simulation is an important assumption. Agents are initially 
assigned a variety of personal and business attributes. Regarding farm agents, individual 
farm size is important in determining appropriate tillage technology, machinery application, 
corresponding returns to scale and potential farmland bid prices. Any failure in buying or 
leasing farmland at a reasonable rate tends to reduce future farm competitiveness. An 
important feedback mechanism at play here is the “balance sheet” effect, meaning that a 
higher farmland value enables farmers to borrow more by relaxing some financial 
constraints and vice versa (Anderson, 2012). 
 
An important dynamic role in the land market is provided by our (three) non-farming 
investors. The introduction of non-farm investor landlords potentially creates higher 
demand in the land purchase market, but can also generate additional supply in the 
                                                 
5 The definition of “winner’s curse” can be found in the footnote in Section 2.3.2. 
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farmland rental market. Thus, a drop in expected rent could counteract an expected price 
increase in the purchasing market. 
 
Farming continuity depends on the ability of the farm to find a qualified and willing 
successor, as well as the on-going profitability of the agricultural business.  As discussed 
in Section 2.3, farm size, farm type and non-farm employment opportunities are all 
important determinants of the probability of successful farm succession.  
 
3.3 Farmer Exit and Succession  
3.3.1 Introduction  
The farmland succession model is an important complementary modification to the 
Anderson (2012) model. Anderson (2012) assumed a fixed and exogenous probability of a 
willing farm successor being available, along with a minimum equity requirement of 
$500,000 necessary to meet projected retirement family living requirements (Anderson, 
2012, p. 83). Here, it is assumed that succession only takes place on economically 
sustainable farms. In section 3.3.2, sustainability and the simulation of farming generations 
and the farm succession process are further discussed. 
 
3.3.2 Farmer Exit and Farm Succession 
The farm succession decision process flowcharts as listed in Anderson (2012) are suitably 
modified and displayed in Figure 3.2.  Note that the census data used in the farm succession 
module can be found in Chapter IV.
 38 
 
3
8
 
Has No Child?
Get the Number 
of Children
No
Get the age to 
have each 
child
Get the age, gender, 
education level and 
off-farm income of 
child i
For the ith child
Calculate the 
willingness of 
succession, Wi of 
child i
Wi>0.8?
Yes
Wi>max(W1,
…,Wi-1)?
No i++
No
i=Number of 
Children?
Yes
No
Yes
The farmer 
retires without 
succession
Yes
Max(W1,…,Wi)
<0.8?
Yes
The child with 
strongest willingness 
takes all the farm
No
A farm decides 
to retire
 
Figure 3.2: Farm Exiting and Succession Module Flowchart 
 
In the simulation, we check whether individual farmers have heirs or not at the beginning 
of the process, and immediately after succession. We use census data of Statistics Canada 
to generate and calibrate the distribution of children within the simulation. Given this, each 
of the farmer agents in the simulation has an assigned probability of having zero children. 
Any given farmer will have zero children if: 
𝑁𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 
                                                                                       (3.1) 
Where: 𝑁𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 is the probability of having zero children and 
            𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏  is a randomly generated probability. 
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If farmers are determined in this manner to bear at least one child, we assign each of them 
a total number of children on the farm, as well as the year the children are born. For 
example, farmers will only have one child if: 
𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 
                                                                                       (3.2) 
 
𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 < 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 
                                                                                 (3.3) 
 
Where: 𝑂𝑛𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏  and 𝑇𝑤𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏  are the randomly generated probabilities 
and 
             𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏  is the assigned probability of having just one or two children. 
 
If the farmers have three or more children, the total number of children is given by: 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 = 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(3.68,1), 0) 
                                              (3.4) 
(Source: Statistics Canada, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/famil50i-eng.htm) 
 
The assigned year for having children, based on Census of Statistics Canada in the year 
2010, is as follows: 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 = 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(27.5,4), 0) 
                                    (3.5) 
(Source: CANSIM Table 102-4505) 
 
Financially, we assume that farming families will not be responsible for any college tuition 
coming from their offspring.  
 
Farm exits are created by retirement, or voluntary and involuntary farm financial conditions. 
Following Anderson (2012), at the beginning of each simulation period, each farm is 
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checked for the net cash flows and solvency. Involuntary or forced exits are created by 
business insolvency and/or problematic cash flows:  
 
𝑇𝐹𝐿 ≥ 𝑇𝐹𝐴 ∗ 0.9 
(3.6) 
Where: TFL is the total farm liabilities (debt) of the farmer and 
TFA is the total farm assets of the farmer. 
 
Chronic cash flow problems can result in involuntary exits. For modeling simplicity, 
farmer agents who experience cash flow deficits more than five years in a row have an 
increasing probability of voluntarily exiting the simulation:   
 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 < 𝑃r𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 
 (3.7) 
Where: RandProb is the randomly generated probability of exit and 
PreProb is the pre-determined probability of exit. 
 
When reaching an age of 55 years, all farmers are assumed to be subject to probabilistic 
retirement. In the simulation, the probability of retirement increases in five-year increments. 
This is modeled as, 
 𝐴𝑔𝑒 ≥  𝐿𝐵𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑒 <  𝑈𝐵𝑎𝑔𝑒 
 (3.8) 
  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 < 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 
 (3.9) 
Where: Age is the current age of the farmer, 
LBage is the lower bound age in that increment, 
UBage is the upper bound age in that increment, 
RetireProb is the probability generated randomly and 
           PreProb is the pre-determined probability for that age increment. 
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In setting actual farm succession, a probabilistic willingness indicator for each heir of 
senior farmers to take over the family farm is calculated by (3.10) and compared to a 
threshold of 0.8. If the willingness indicators for all heirs are less than the threshold, there 
would be no family succession. Otherwise, the heir with the strongest willingness takes 
over the entire farm and replaces the old farmer, taking over everything including reserved 
cash, machinery, farmland and debt. 
 
3.3.3 Survey and Succession Equation 
In order to quantify the effects of heterogeneity on succession probability, University of 
Saskatchewan (College of Agriculture) undergraduate students who are also the children 
of farmers were asked as to their opinion as to how their own farm peers would respond to 
a number of questions.6 A total of 98 students participated with 64 usable results from 
March 20, 2015, to April 1, 2015. The questionnaire can be found in Appendix E. Survey 
questions included off-farm wage, farm size, farm type and gender of heirs as determinants 
for farm succession. The estimated equation of our succession model is shown in 3.10, and 
additional details are found in Appendix B. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 0.68 + 0.02 ∗ 𝑂𝑛𝑤𝑒𝑟 + 0.06 ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑) − 0.15 ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 − 0.05
∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 0.23 ∗ 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 
(3.10) 
Where: Owner is the percentage of land owned by the farmer,  
LLand is the log value of acres of land,  
Gender is the dummy variable for gender of the respondents, 1 is male,  
Income is the projected off-farm wage and  
                                                 
6 The University of Saskatchewan Committee for Ethics in Human Research (UCEHR) was contacted and 
ultimately determined that the succession questionnaire did not fall within their purview, and so did not 
require ethics approval. This decision was made because of the nature of the questions posed: students were 
asked about their opinions as to the likely response of their farm peers, which do not constitute responses 
about themselves.  
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Type is the dummy variable for farm type - 1 is pure grain and 0 is mixed farms or 
pure beef farms. 
 
The variable “Income” in (3.10) is calculated based on (3.11).  
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚(0.7,1.3)
∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑒 
(3.11) 
Where: 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙  is the average wage of each 
education level, drawn from census data. 
 
3.4 Farmland Auction 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The land auction is the only means in the model to change land ownership. Moreover, 
auctions take place only once per simulated period (one calendar year). Based on the 
Anderson (2012) model, there are two types of land, cropland and marginal land. The 
auction of cropland is conducted prior to the auction of marginal land because while 
farmers can participate in both auctions, investors are assumed to only participate in 
cropland actions. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the procedure of our farmland auctions. 
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Figure 3.3: Farmland Bidding and Leasing Auction Flowchart 
 
The supply of farmland at any given time comes from exiting farmers. In the auction market, 
due to land heterogeneity, each parcel is auctioned separately based on its attributes. In the 
purchase market, the auctioneer agent is responsible for managing the auction. The farmer 
or investor with highest bid price will acquire land if the price is greater than the reserve 
asking price of the seller.  
 
3.4.2 Farmer Agent Land Bid Value Formulation 
Following Anderson (2012) and Stolniuk (2008), since the incentive for farm expansion is 
to achieve a higher return on the scale, farmers who meet cash flow and financial criteria 
can submit bids in farmland purchase auctions. In the farmland rental auctions, only 
farmers participate. Their bidding price in the latter is solely based upon yield and product 
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selling price expectations, computed as moving averages of the previous five years 
(Stolniuk, (2008).  
 
All farm agents are screened prior to entering their farm level strategic optimization 
problems (a mixed integer program, or MIP) by age, debt load and minimum cash flow. 
All farmers who want to perform land expansion must pass the financial bid screen prior 
to entering the purchase market. If they cannot enter the purchase market, these farmers 
must proceed to the land rental market. Farmers who pass the financial bid screen will first 
enter the purchase market where they try to submit bids high enough to obtain the chosen 
parcel of land, with sufficient cash flows as projected are maintained. As a result, farmer 
agents’ maximum bidding capacities are restrained by their financial bid. The financial bid 
equation is: 
 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝐹𝑖𝑛 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ,𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑/𝑎) 
 (3.12) 
Where: BidFin is the financial bid 
BidCash is the bid based on available cash and 
BidD/A is the maximum bid to maintain sufficient debt to asset ratio. 
 
Available cash represents the cash flow needed to maintain a positive cash balance for the 
farm expansion phase. The definition of total available cash is based on Stolniuk (2008) 
and includes the following - minimum cash per acre and per cow for all farm enterprises 
and down payments for new capital investments.  The available cash formula is written as: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙 = 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑤 −𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑎𝑚− ∝ (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠 
(3.13) 
Where: Mincash is the minimum cash per acre for each farm enterprise, 
Mincow is the lowest cash amount per cow required, 
Minfam is the minimum family withdrawal expense, 
α is the down payment percent required on new borrowing, 
CapValue is new land asset value and 
 45 
 
4
5
 
CashRes is cash reserves required of the farm. 
 
The maximum debt-to-asset ratio bid is calculated as follows: 
 
   (3.14) 
Where: γ is the maximum debt-to-asset ratio allowed, 
α is the down-payment, 
Assetsnew is the new assets required (plus old assets), 
LandValue is the market value of the land and 
Debtnew is the new debt (plus old debt) of the new assets,  
 
These purchase bids are income based and are the net present value of the certainty 
equivalent of future income earning ability (𝑅𝑡
𝑋𝑌) and final land value (𝐸𝑉𝑛) using r, the 
risk-free rate,  
 𝐵𝑢𝑦 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑥𝑦 = ∑ (
𝐸[𝐶𝐸(𝑅𝑡
𝑋𝑌)]
(1+𝑟)𝑡
+ 
𝐸[𝐶𝐸(𝐸𝑉)]
(1+𝑟)𝑛
𝑛
𝑡=1  
 (3.15) 
Where: r is the assumed risk-free discount rate. 
 
Expected income comes from the objective function for the MIP problem. We use annual 
contribution margins, less variable and fixed costs for machinery and labor variable costs 
as well as costs associated with additional land acquisitions, less expected income taxes 
and family living. If Incomebid is larger than the financialbid, the higher bid submitted to the 
land auction becomes the financialbid.   
 
3.4.3 Institutional Investor Agent Land Bid Value Formulation 
3.4.3.1 Introduction 
The introduction of institutional investor agents is a critical component to our simulation 
model. In order represent the complex and highly heterogeneous world of institutional 
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investors. But to maintain tractability, we assume that just three institutional investor 
agents can represent such diverse institutions as pension funds and insurance companies. 
By assuming rationality in maximizing their risk-return, following Tobin (1958) that is 
discussed in Section 2.2.2, all investors share a common set of behavioral accounting 
equations and decision-making processes. Table 3 is employed to introduce the three 
institutional investor agents. 
 
Table 3.1: The Definition of Three Institutional Investor Agents 
Investor Agent Type Characteristics
Full Investor
This investor agent can buy all of the ten 
international stock indices
Non Asian Investor
This investor agent cannot buy Nikkie (Japan) 
and Hang Seng (Hong Kong) Indices
North American Investor
This Investor agent can only buy NASDAQ and 
TSX (Canada) Stock Indices  
 
The following flow diagram, Figure 3.4, is shown to give a flavor of the behavioral patterns 
of our institutional investors. There are two stages in the institutional agent bid formulation 
process. First, the investor agents generate their own optimal portfolio and the associated 
farmland bidding price, based on E-V analysis and CAPM. All optimal portfolio 
proportions are generated exogenously based on the exogenous asset prices as discussed in 
3.4.3.2 and 3.4.3.3. In the second stage of this process, all investors participate in a sealed 
bid land auction.  
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Get Beta Values
Calculate E(X) of 
Farmland
Calculate the 
Reserved 
Bidding Price
Bidding 
Farmland from 
Auctions
T+1
 
Figure 3.4: Investor Agent Flowchart 
 
3.4.3.2 Theoretical Optimal Portfolio Construction  
Following section 2.2, investors conduct an E-V analysis to determine the optimal portfolio 
bundle. This is computed as, 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜) =X’QX 
= (𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎3 … 𝑎𝑛) (
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴1) ⋯ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐴1, 𝐴𝑛)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐴𝑛, 𝐴1) ⋯ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑛)
)(
𝑎1
𝑎2
⋮
𝑎𝑛
) 
(3.16) 
Expand this to get: 
𝑆𝐷(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜) =  √∑𝑎𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑖) +∑∑2𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐴𝑖, 𝐴𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=2
𝑛
𝑖=2
𝑛
𝑖=2
 
 
(3.17) 
Where   𝑎𝑖 is the Proportion of asset 𝐴𝑖 in the portfolio, 
            𝐴𝑖 is the Asset i. 
  
Moreover, the average return will be: 
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𝑅(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜) =∑𝑅𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=2
 
 (3.18) 
Where:  𝑅(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜) is the optimal return for the portfolio, 
              𝑅𝑖 is the geometric mean of asset return
7 and 
              𝑎𝑖 is the optimal proporation of asset i.  
 
Furthermore, the most efficient asset allocation (Chapter 2) maximizes the portfolio Sharpe 
Ratio or return-risk ratio: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑅(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜) − 𝑟
𝑆𝐷(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑜)
 
=
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝑎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
√∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑖) + ∑ ∑ 2𝑎𝑖𝑎𝑗𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐴𝑖, 𝐴𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=2
𝑛
𝑖=2
𝑛
𝑖=2
 
(3.19) 
 
From (3.19) and assuming concavity, we can find the proportion of each asset, a1 to an by 
the following: 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜕𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
𝜕𝑎2
= 0
𝜕𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
𝜕𝑎2
⋮
= 0
𝜕𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
𝜕𝑎𝑛
= 0
∑𝑎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=2
= 1
 
(3.20) 
                                                 
7 A geometric mean is applied here because it fits data with wide fluctuation and two digits compared with 
arithmetic mean. 
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(3.20) is used to find the optimal portfolio bundle.  
3.4.3.3 Institutional Investor Agent Reserved Farmland Buying Price Determination 
Following Chapter 2 we can write, 
𝛽𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 = 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑓 , 𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜)
𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜)
 
(3.21) 
Where：𝛽𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 is the Beta value for the whole portfolio, 
             𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑜 is the return of portfolio on CML and         
               𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate. 
 
To determine the beta value exogenously for model simplicity, we assume that 1) the 
𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑖𝑜 is equal to the optimal investment portfolio beta value excluding farmland, and 
2) that the return on farmland in (3.21) is the 30-year historical farmland return to calculate 
the covariance of farmland and portfolio, and the return on portfolio is the optimal portfolio 
of all simulated stock indices excluding farmland. Accordingly, investor agents calculate 
the bidding value of farmland based on their expected return imputed from its investment 
portfolio: 
𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿) =  𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∗ (𝑅𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 − 𝑅𝑓) 
(3.22) 
Where  𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿) = the expected return of farmland and 
             𝑅𝑓 = risk-free rate. 
 
The bid value is then based on the NPV of future earning ability using 𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿) as the 
discount rate: 
𝑃𝑉𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 =∑
𝐶𝐺𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 − 𝑇𝐶𝑡
(1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿))𝑡
+
𝑃𝑛
𝑓 − (𝑃𝑛
𝑓 − 𝑃𝑉𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑) ∗ 0.5 ∗ 𝑡𝑛
(1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿))𝑛
𝑛
𝑡=1
 
(3.23) 
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Where:  𝐶𝐺𝑡 is the capital gain in period t, 
              𝑅𝑡 is the rent in period t, 
                𝑃𝑡 is the property tax in period t, 
              𝐶𝑡 = economic cost in period t, 
              𝑇𝐶𝑡 = transaction cost in period t, 
              𝑃𝑛
𝑓
 = future selling price and 
              𝑡𝑛 = future income tax rate. 
 
(3.23) is equal to capitalization formula: 
𝑃𝑉𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑
= min 
(
 
 𝐶𝐺0 + 𝑅0 − 𝑃0 − 𝑇0
𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿)
,
∑
𝐶𝐺𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡
(1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿))
𝑡 + 𝑃30
𝑓 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑃30
𝑓 ∗ 𝑡30
30
𝑡=1
(1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿))
30
− 0.5 ∗ 𝑡30
)
 
 
 
(3.24) 
Where: 𝐶𝐺0 is the expected capital gain, 
            𝑅0 is the expected rent determined endogenously, 
              𝑃0 is the expected property tax, 
             𝑇0 is the expected transaction cost, 
             𝑃30
𝑓
 is the expected selling price in the 30th year and 
             𝑡30 is the expected income tax rate in the 30
th year. 
. 
To avoid “winner’s curse” in land bids or another irrational bidding, an upper limit for land 
bid price is imposed on institutional investors, and the tender price is shown in (3.25): 
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𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡
= 𝑀𝑖𝑛
(
 
 𝐶𝐺0 + 𝑅0 − 𝑃0 − 𝑇0
𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿)
,
∑
𝐶𝐺𝑡 + 𝑅𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡
(1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿))
𝑡 + 𝑃30
𝑓 − 0.5 ∗ 𝑃30
𝑓 ∗ 𝑡30
30
𝑡=1
(1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿))
30
− 0.5 ∗ 𝑡30
, 𝑈𝑛𝑖(1.5,2)
∗ 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡−1
)
 
 
 
(3.25) 
Where: 
           𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 is the bidding price of farmland in period t, 
            𝑈𝑛𝑖(1.5,2) is a uniform distribution from 1.5 to 2 and 
            𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡−1 is the bidding price of farmland in period t-1. 
 
Farmer agents have a much more elaborate model of expected price formulation that 
includes some “memory” of past prices. While investors have a similar price expectation 
structure in land rent expectations, these are not in place for non-land returns. In contrast, 
institutional investors have no financial constraints. This situation creates the potential for 
institutional investor-driven farmland price market exuberance. Accordingly, we set upper 
bounds on farmland bid price changes from year to year.  Historically (1971 to 2014), real 
annual farmland price changes never exceeded 150% of the price in last year. So, in order 
to provide somewhat more flexible upper bounds, we assume that the upper bound on year-
to-year bid value increases ranges from a ratio of 1.5 to 2.0.  Thus, our upper bid bound is 
stochastically set as a random number drawn from a uniform distribution between 1.5 and 
28 (i.e. Uni (1.5,2)).  
 
Each investor determines their bid price independently and they also compete against each 
                                                 
8 Since we look at the length of 30 future years, we allow a big sample size to include all the possible scenarios 
along with the time paths. 
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other. However, with a sealed bidding process as assumed here, other agent bidding prices 
are unknown for each bidder.  
 
3.4.4 Farmland Selling Minimum Acceptable Bid Formulation 
When sellers enter a farmland market, they hold a reserve price based on a capitalized 
expected lease rate for both farmers and investors. Following Anderson (2012), the 
capitalized lease rate is calculated using the last updated lease rate and the expected change 
in the rental rate for the coming year based on price expectations for all commodities. 
Further, we assume that there is no transaction cost for the farmers on land purchases and 
the rental market, but following Schnitkey, Taylor, and Barry (1989), “5% charge of 
brokerage fee” (p.145) is placed on the value of reserved price as transaction costs. This 
equation is as follows, 
𝐸(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = 𝐿𝑟𝑡−1 + ∑
(𝐸(𝑃𝑡,𝑖)− 𝐸(𝑃𝑡−1,𝑖))
𝐸(𝑃𝑡−1,𝑖)
∗ 𝐿𝑟𝑡−1
2
𝑖=1  
 (3.26) 
Where: E(CapLease) is the expected capitalized lease rate, 
Lrt-1 is the rental rate from last year, 
E(Pt, i) is the expected price of commodity I, 
E(Pt-1, i) is the expected price of commodity I last year. 
 
The minimum accepted price for the farmers then becomes: 
 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 =
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒∗(1− 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝐹𝑒𝑒)
𝑟
 
 (3.27) 
Where: RiskOwner is the risk level of the current owner based on probability, 
CapLease is the adjusted lease of the capitalized lease rate, 
AdmFee is the management fee for the auction process and 
r is the discount rate. 
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Again, following Anderson (2012), we assume that 25% of farmer-owned land entering 
the purchase market has an amplified urgency to sell due to various reasons, including 
death, divorce or other circumstances. Thus the minimum acceptable selling price in these 
cases is reduced by 65%.   
 
3.4.5 Minimum Rental Acceptable Bid Formulation 
The land rental market also results from the strategic farm level MIP model. Lease bid 
value is income based and is calculated from the expected after-tax income less family 
living, divided by the total crop acres and then multiplied by a risk parameter,   
 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 =
𝐴𝐼
𝑇𝐶𝐴 
 𝛼 
 (3.28) 
Where: AI is the After-tax expected Income, 
TCA is the total crop acres and 
α is the risk parameter of the farmer. 
 
As for investor landlords, we impose a fixed proportion of transaction cost for institutional 
investors, to capture the fact that they are not likely to have adequate rural land and farming 
experience. So, their reserve price will be: 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 =
 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 ∗ (1 − 𝐴𝑑𝑚𝐹𝑒𝑒)
𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿)
∗ (1 + 𝑡𝑐%) 
(3.29) 
 
Where: CapLease is the adjusted lease of the capitalized lease rate, 
AdmFee is the management fee for the auction process, 
𝐸(𝑅𝐹𝐿) is the expected return of farmland based on historical return and 
tc% is the transaction cost rate. 
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3.4.6 Lease Renegotiation 
At the beginning of every year, a random choice is generated for lease renegotiation for 
both farm-owned and investor-owned farmland. This is calculated as, 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 
                                                                               (3.30)                                                 
Where: 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏is a randomly generated probability and 
            PreProb is a pre-determined probability for lease renegotiation. 
 
If the random number generated is greater than the pre-set lease renewal probability, the 
leased will be renewed for next period. Otherwise, the lease will remain so for the next 
year. But lease values will be automatically re-adjusted to the prevailing market lease rate 
if they have either increased or decreased by 20% in any given time interval. 
 
3.4.7 The Auctioneer Agent 
Following Anderson (2012), all farmers and investors must submit their bids to the 
auctioneer agent. The bidding process is sealed and thus bidders are ignorant of others’ bid 
prices. The auctioneer agent sorts all farmland for sale according to its inherent 
productivity rating, and either the cropland or marginal land market. Likewise, the land 
lease market follows the same process. However, unlike the purchase market, the land 
rental market has no reservation price. Moreover, if there is no bid to lease a plot of 
farmland in a given year, the auctioneer asserts that the plot of farmland remains idle until 
next year’s auction. 
 
3.5 Taxation Treatments for Farmland Transfer 
According to the Section 85 of the Canadian Income Tax Act (ITA), “the capital cost to 
the transferee of the property is deemed to be the amount that was its capital cost to the 
transferor, and the excess is considered to have been deducted by the transfer”. This is 
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known as the “rollover”: retired farmers can transfer farm assets to their children and enjoy 
tax deferral from generation to generation by selling, gifting or inheritance. Eventually, 
when a successor sells farmland (from April 20, 2015 onwards) the exemption limit for 
lifetime capital gains for farm assets including farmland is $1,000,000 dollars.  
The exemption will likely exempt the income tax from capital gain from all farmland sales 
by farmers. However, under Canadian law investors still have to pay 50% of the capital 
gains from farmland sales to taxable income for the current year, and the tax rate is 11% 
for the first $44,601 dollars, 13% of next $82,829 dollars and 15% for the reminder. This 
will need to be considered in investor bidding prices for farmland. As a result, investors 
will subtract projected tax payments when calculating their expected capital gain. 
Moreover, buyers of farmland, both farmers and investors, have no obligation for the goods 
and service tax (GST) (this tax rate in Saskatchewan is 5%) because the land remains in 
agricultural production. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE DATA 
4.0 Introduction  
In this chapter, we present the physical and financial characteristics of farms located in 
CAR 1 in Saskatchewan. This region has a relatively heterogeneous landscape that varies 
from relatively flat, highly productive cropland to unimproved pasture. The former allows 
pure crop farms while the latter is associated with beef or dairy herds (Anderson, 2012) 
and is a good test of my model.   
 
There are four general types of data reviewed in this chapter: 1) those data associated with 
the landscape, 2) those data associated with the farmer agent characteristics, 3) non-
stochastic data associated with the individual farm businesses and their associated decision 
making and 4) stochastic farm commodity yields and prices and the various stock market 
indices returns.  
 
The first three data sets are mostly based on Anderson (2012) updated for price changes 
and inflation to 2015. However, estimates of potential heir off-farm opportunity costs are 
required by a much more developed model of farm business succession. In the model, the 
wage for off-farm employment, as the opportunity costs for farming, is based on real-world 
statistics in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 in Section 4.2.2.  The fourth data type, stochastic data 
are associated with the various possible future time paths. A new method used to generate 
a total of 100 different 30 -year future time paths crop yields, crop prices and financial 
indices is reviewed and verified against historical data.  
 
4.1 The Regional Landscape   
The landscape of the research area, CAR 1A, is a portion of the Assiniboine River Basin 
of Saskatchewan, located in the southeast corner of the province (Figure 4.1). According 
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to the 2011 Census of Agriculture9, there are 2,679,151 acres of arable land in CAR 1A. 
Detailed land use is represented in Table 4.1. In the CAR 1A area, about 60% is farmland 
used for crop production and about 20% of the land is used for pasture or hay production.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Census Agriculture Region (CAR) and CAR 1A 
 (Source: 2011 Census, Statistics Canada) 
 
Table 4.1: Land Use in CAR 1A 
Area Proportion
(1,000 Acres) (%)
Cropland 1,447 54.0%
Summerfallow Land 157 5.85%
Tame or Seeded Pasture 245 9.15%
Nature Land of Pasture 350 13.1%
Wooldlands and Wetlands 133 4.97%
Other 347 13.0%
Land Type
 
(Source: 2011 Agricultural Census, Statistics Canada) 
                                                 
9 The 2011 National Agriculture Census result was the latest available data when conducting the study during 2014 to 
2016.  
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4.1.1 Study Landscape 
Following Anderson (2012), there is a total of 1099 plots of land in the simulation (1 plot 
= 640 acres) varying in potential land use, productivity and location. 
 
4.2 Farm and Farm Operator Characteristics 
4.2.1 An Overview of CAR 1A Farms 
By the 2011 Census, there is a total of 1,501 farms with 2,040 operators in the region, 17.7% 
fewer than existed in 2006. The major types of grain grown are wheat, canola, flax, barley, 
durum, pea, lentils and hay. The main types of livestock are beef cows and calves (Table 
4.3).  
Table 4.2: Production in CAR 1A 
Areas
(1,000 Acres)
Hay 885 23.4
Wheat 811 40.7
Canola 604 39.4
Flaxseed 311 9.17
Barley 269 7.00
Pea 115 4.70
Durum 107 8.66
Lentils 61 2.57
Others 559 7.95
Heads
(1,000 Head)
Beef Cow 614 51.5
Calves 622 40.2
Sheep and Lamb 34 2.36
Pig 9 0.31
Horse 317 4.27
Others 52 1.21
Crop Type
Livestock Type
Number of Farm
Number of Farm
 
* The number does not include broilers, dairy cattle or turkeys. 
(Source: 2011 Census, Statistics Canada) 
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Farm characteristics and operator age distribution in the CAR are reported in Table 4.4 
and 4.5, respectively. 
Table 4.3: Characteristics of Farms in CAR 1A 
Farm Size
Number 
of Farm
Total Farm Capital
Number 
of Farm
Total Farm Receipt
Number 
of Farm
<240 Acres 209 <$350,000 281 <$25,000 319
240-760 Acres 366 $350,000-$1,000,000 564 $25,000-$100,000 433
760-2280 Acres 669 $1,000,000-$2,000,000 355 $100,000-$500,000 525
>2280 Acres 257 >$2,000,000 301 >$500,000 224  
(Source: 2011 Census, Statistics Canada) 
Table 4.4: Characteristics of Farmers in CAR 1A 
Farm Age
Number 
of Farm
<35 205        
35-54 845        
>55 990        
Average Age 53.6
Farm Gender
Number 
of Farm
Male 1,595      
Female 450         
(Source: 2011 Census, Statistics Canada) 
 
From Table 4.4 and 4.5, most of the farms in CAR 1A are mid-sized (240 – 2280 acres), 
and about 50% of the farmers are 55 or older. 
 
4.2.2 Off-farm Income and Education 
The education level of the relevant Saskatchewan population is shown in Table 4.6 for 
2006. 
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Table 4.5: Education Level Distribution in Saskatchewan in 2006 
Education Level Percentage
<High School 30.2%
High School 26.8%
Trades Certificate 11.3%
College 14.6%
University Degree <Bachlor 4.20%
Bachelor 9.30%
>Bachlor 3.59%  
(Source: CANSIM Table 109-0300) 
 
The inflation-adjusted expected annual income based on their gender, age and education 
are presented in Table 4.7 for the entire Canadian population.  
 
Table 4.6: Inflation Adjusted Real Annual Income in Canada (2006) 
Age <Secondary Secondary Trades College <Bachlor Bachelor >Bachlor
25-34 $36,280 $38,605 $45,744 $46,339 $47,409 $54,434 $56,478
35-44 $39,340 $45,791 $52,383 $57,040 $56,376 $71,849 $79,040
45-54 $39,665 $47,310 $54,136 $60,170 $63,530 $76,943 $89,498
55-64 $30,488 $38,693 $45,517 $49,001 $52,922 $72,127 $88,750
25-34 $21,685 $26,576 $27,871 $34,477 $38,992 $51,046 $56,033
35-44 $25,413 $32,362 $32,850 $39,641 $52,877 $62,367 $69,599
45-54 $28,401 $35,428 $34,750 $42,761 $52,179 $69,494 $73,985
55-64 $26,486 $32,264 $30,742 $40,466 $46,029 $63,160 $74,311
Male
Female
 
(Source: Statistics Canada, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/hlt/97-563/T803-
eng.cfm?Lang=E&T=803&GH=4&SC=1&SO=99&O=A) 
 
4.2.3 Synthetic Farm Population 
The model landscape is fixed over the entire period of study but our (synthetic) farm 
population characteristics are fixed only upon model initialization. The simulated 
populations vary subsequently as it ages, as farmers exit or enter and as farms grow or 
disappear from farming. Farmer agents vary in farm size, age, and financial situation, risk 
preferences and in preference/aversion for/to cattle. Following Anderson (2012), our 
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synthetic farmer population characteristics are based on CAR 1A using 2011 Census data 
(Statistics Canada 2011). Important farmer agent characteristics include farmer age, farm 
size, off-farm income, and debts and assets. The initial synthetic farm agent population is 
set at exactly 717 farmers.   
 
As in Anderson (2012) and Stolniuk (2008), farm assets include cash, farmland, cropping 
and beef handling systems, as well as machinery and beef cow herd. Initial beef cow 
systems and cropping machinery levels are based on the farm size. The synthetic farm 
population is updated for changes in farm assets to the year 2015 and since the debt-asset 
ratio is assumed to be constant, farm debt must also be updated. The initial farm debt to 
asset ratio is randomly assigned as a per acre value of the various farms. A total of 159 
(22%) farms has no debt at the beginning of the simulation, while the average debt per acre 
is set at $78.7910.  
 
Off-farm income is assigned randomly to farm agents based on farm size: smaller farms 
have higher off-farm income and vice versa following Anderson (2012) in Table 4.9. The 
initial ages of farmers, farm assets, farm debt and farming acreage are shown in Tables 
4.13 to 4.16. 
 
We assume that farmer heirs can obtain off-farm employment anywhere.  Accordingly, a 
stochastic education level is used to generate potential off-farm income for farm heirs, 
according to Table 4.7. This subsequently sets their off-farm opportunity cost and affects 
their willingness to succeed, found in equations (3.10) and (3.11) in the previous chapter.  
 
The plot assignments to individual farmer agents are also retained from the work of 
Anderson (2012). From Tables 4.14 and 4.16, larger farms possess higher asset values, and 
                                                 
10 The original debt level and distribution is based on an individual farm survey following Anderson (2012). 
Since there is no farm-level data in CAR 1A region, in this study, the average debt per acre is adjusted by 
inflation, but the debt distribution and levels of Anderson (2012) are used in this study. 
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farmers with higher asset value and larger farming acreage tend to have higher debt. Finally, 
farm age allocation can be found in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7: Initial Age of Farmers by Farm Acreage 
20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 >70 Total Percentage
<1 23 43 77 76 41 24 284 39.6%
1-2 14 38 76 82 38 27 275 38.4%
2-3 2 12 33 27 10 3 87 12.1%
3-5 0 10 17 15 10 4 56 7.81%
>5 1 4 4 4 2 0 15 2.09%
Total 40 107 207 204 101 58
Percentage 5.58% 14.9% 28.9% 28.5% 14.1% 8.09%
717
Farmed Acres 
(1,000 Acres)
Farmer Age 
100%
 
 
Table 4.8: Initial Farm Assets by Farm Acreage 
Asset Value 
($100,000)
Grade >1 1-2 2-3 3-5 >5 Total Percentage
0-5 97 1 0 0 0 98 13.7%
5-10 108 63 1 0 0 172 24.0%
10-20 76 101 21 1 0 199 27.8%
20-30 3 83 24 5 0 115 16.0%
30-40 0 10 14 23 0 47 6.56%
40-50 0 17 2 2 0 21 2.93%
50-100 0 0 25 19 3 47 6.56%
100-200 0 0 0 6 6 12 1.67%
200-300 0 0 0 0 3 3 0.42%
>300 0 0 0 0 3 3 0.42%
Total 284 275 87 56 15
Persantage 39.6% 38.4% 12.1% 7.8% 2.1%
717 100%
Farmed Acres (1,000 Acres)
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Table 4.9: Initial Off-farm Income by Farm Acreage 
>1 1-2 2-3 3-5 >5 Total Percentage
0 90 92 22 14 6 224 31.2%
0-5 18 25 5 10 3 61 8.51%
5-10 11 23 11 3 0 48 6.69%
10-20 23 19 8 3 0 53 7.39%
20-40 46 29 16 8 2 101 14.1%
40-60 51 42 12 6 0 111 15.5%
60-100 28 23 9 8 3 71 9.90%
>100 17 22 4 4 1 48 6.69%
Total 284 275 87 56 15
Persantage 39.6% 38.4% 12.1% 7.81% 2.09%
717 100%
Off-farm 
Income 
($1,000)
Farmed Acres (1,000 Acres)
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Table 4.10: Initial Farm Debt by Asset 
0-5 5-10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-100 100-200 200-300 >300 Total Percentage
0 10 35 37 27 11 3 3 1 0 1 128 17.9%
0-5 33 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 53 7.39%
5-10 22 23 18 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 71 9.90%
10-15 11 25 9 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 49 6.83%
15-20 14 11 17 4 1 0 4 0 0 0 51 7.11%
20-25 2 18 10 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 38 5.30%
25-30 2 21 22 8 2 0 3 0 0 0 58 8.09%
30-50 4 14 33 16 1 2 1 1 0 0 72 10.0%
50-100 0 7 35 36 12 6 8 1 0 0 105 14.6%
100-300 0 0 16 14 12 8 20 3 1 1 75 10.5%
300-500 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 5 0 0 13 1.81%
>500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 4 0.56%
Total 98 172 199 115 47 21 47 12 3 3
Percentage 13.7% 24.0% 27.8% 16.0% 6.56% 2.93% 6.56% 1.67% 0.42% 0.42%
717 100%
Debt Value 
($1,000)
Asset Value ($100,000)
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4.3. Non-stochastic Farm Business Variables: Farm Enterprise Costs, and Resource 
Requirements  
Farm enterprise costs and resource requirements are based on Anderson (2012), but 
updated for price changes, yet they are assumed to remain constant over the simulation 
period. Initial beef cow numbers are set according to the farmer agent and associated 
forage acres. The initial herd forage handling system and crop machinery package owned 
are based on farm size and are set in the initialization phase. However, these factors may 
change with changes in farm size. Here, we assume ten different farming machinery 
packages according to farm size, and that farmer agents select the least-cost machinery 
package as they change farm size.11 The exact purchasing cost and variable costs for the 
machinery packages can be found in Appendix D.  
 
4.4. Stochastic Variables: Future Time Paths 
The DualInvestment model tracks farmer agents and investors for a total of 100 simulated 
time paths over 30 years. Each time path corresponds to one iteration of the simulation and 
these are held constant over all scenarios. The key to estimating the future variable time 
paths are 1) autocorrelation between years, and 2) correlations between stochastic variables. 
The following sections describe the procedure used to generate the time paths for 1) 
financial markets and 2) farm commodity prices and yields.  
 
The historically low correlation between stock market yields and Saskatchewan farm 
commodity prices and yields (<20% in general) means that the time paths of stock market 
yields and farm commodity prices and yields are generated independently. 
 
                                                 
11   Farm size is a long-run strategic decision and is an important management variable in the integer 
programming model. Each machinery package has an associated investment requirement, annual cost and a 
maximum acreage constraint. There are no lower bounds, however. Hence, a change in size may require an 
accompanying shift to a different least-cost machinery package. 
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The general procedure used to estimate time paths is described in the following sections. 
The simulated time paths are presented followed by a comparison of the simulated data to 
historical data. It is important to verify our various time paths. While there is no way to 
check all the possible future paths used here, simulated time paths can be compared to 
historical data in a very general way. This is an important part of model verification, a 
process that helps determine whether the simulation has been correctly programmed and 
that the data have been entered correctly (Xiang, Kennedy and Madey, 2005). Here, much 
of this basic ABSM has already been verified by Anderson (2012). However, the various 
time paths are unique to this thesis and should also be verified. Important considerations in 
time path verification include 1) comparisons of simulated to historical data based on 
means and correlations, and 2) degree of coverage of the variable sample space. 
 
4.4.1 Simulated Future Financial Market Yields 
Ten different stock indices from the U.S., Canada, Australia, Germany, France, UK, Spain, 
Japan and Hong Kong are considered in our financial portion of the simulation. These 
markets were chosen because all of them are informationally transparent, with limited 
political interference and they also contain sufficient historical data to generate reasonable 
asset returns and correlations. On that note, the relevant risk-free asset considered here is 
the 3-month bond issued by the Bank of Canada. 
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Table 4.11: Historical (1970-2014) Correlation and Variance 
Country US Hong Kong Japan UK Germany France Spain Canada Australia 3MBOBC
US 100% 39.2% 36.5% 59.1% 55.8% 57.6% 47.2% 74.1% 56.1% 10.5%
Hong Kong 39.2% 100% 33.7% 42.4% 36.6% 35.2% 33.9% 42.5% 43.0% -1.43%
Japan 36.5% 33.7% 100% 41.4% 40.8% 43.7% 42.2% 37.4% 37.2% 4.54%
UK 59.1% 42.4% 41.4% 100% 54.3% 63.1% 48.0% 57.9% 55.0% 7.00%
Germany 55.8% 36.6% 40.8% 54.3% 100% 73.2% 58.5% 49.6% 45.6% 3.60%
France 57.6% 35.2% 43.7% 63.1% 73.2% 100% 59.4% 55.2% 49.7% 5.43%
Spain 47.2% 33.9% 42.2% 48.0% 58.5% 59.4% 100% 45.6% 46.6% 4.25%
Canada 74.1% 42.5% 37.4% 57.9% 49.6% 55.2% 45.6% 100% 65.4% 0.38%
Australia 56.1% 43.0% 37.2% 55.0% 45.6% 49.7% 46.6% 65.4% 100% 4.23%
3MBOBC 10.5% -1.43% 4.54% 7.00% 3.60% 5.43% 4.25% 0.38% 4.23% 100.0%
S.D. 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.00  
Note: 3MBOCB stands for three-month bond issued by Bank of Canada. 
 
Asset correlations between different indices are presented in Table 4.11. The various 
indices are correlated between themselves with values that range between 35% and 75%, 
indicating potential for diversification. In addition, the various indices chosen have 
sufficiently low correlations with the risk-free rate that independence can be assumed.  
 
In generating simulated historical relationships between the indices, the U.S. stock index 
is assumed to move freely and the remaining relationships are based on their correlation 
with the U.S. stock index. For example, Canadian stock indices have the highest correlation 
with the U.S. stock index and accordingly, this historical relationship is a simple linear 
function of the U.S. index, plus a random error. The UK stock index has the second largest 
correlation with U.S - its relationship is generated using a linear function of both U.S. and 
Canadian indices plus an error term, and so on. All parameters here are estimated using 
OLS regressions. In setting the various time paths for these variables, the real return of the 
U.S. stock index NASDAQ is calculated as: 
𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑡 = 𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖 
(4.1) 
Where:  𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑡 is the simulated real return in the future time t, 
             𝑁𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑡−1 is the simulated real return in the future time t-1 and 
             𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖 is the difference of historical real returns in a randomly generated 
period. 
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But in applying this method, we found that the generated variance is excessive as compared 
with actual data. This problem is very typical for resampling processes (Breiman, 1996). 
Subsequently following Parmanto, Munro and Doyle (1996), we know that the average of 
a set of resampled data will decrease the variance without adding more bias. So, an average 
of five simulated paths was used to generate a similar variance pattern to the historical data. 
The following equations are used to generate our other indices: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
(4.2) 
 
𝜇𝑖,𝑡~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡) 
(4.3) 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1,1) = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜃1 ∗ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝜃2 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡
2  
(4.4) 
Where: 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is the real return for index i in time t, 
            𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑗,𝑡 is the real return for index j in time t, 
            𝜇𝑖,𝑡  is the simulated error, 
           𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2  is the variance of the simulated error for index i in time t, 
           𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2  is the variance of the simulated error for index i in time t-1, 
           𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑗 are the parameters from an OLS regression on other indices and 
𝛾𝑖 , 𝜃1  and 𝜃2  are the parameters from a GARCH (1,1) process for variance 
simulation. 
 
Following Bauwens et al. (2006), GARCH model can be applied in the studies of “the 
relations between the volatilities and co-volatilities of several markets” (p.79). In this study, 
the GARCH (1,1) model is used to estimate the variance of the residues and take into 
account the correlation between the different stock markets. 
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4.4.1.1 Verification of the Simulated Stock Return Time Paths  
Four of the 100 simulated time paths for four chosen stock indices are displayed in Figures 
4.2-4.4 as examples of simulated stock returns. While individual variable movements are 
somewhat difficult to discern in these graphs, the overall patterns highlight the following: 
1) variable ranges fall within expectations, based on historical ranges, and 2) the full range 
of values is in fact sampled over all simulated years. As the base index, we note that the 
time paths for NASDAQ are most stable with the least “vibration.” Alternatively, following 
historical data, the Hang Seng Index generates the greatest oscillations with the highest 
variance (Figure 4.4)   
 70 
 
7
0
 
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2015 2018 2021 2024 2027 2030 2033 2036 2039 2042
%
 o
f 
R
et
u
rn
Year
Figure 4.3 Simulated Time Paths, Spanish Stock Index Returns 
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Figure 4.2: Simulated Time Paths of NASDAQ Stock Index Returns 
 71 
 
7
1
 
 
Figure 4.4: Simulated Time Paths, Hong Kong Stock Index Returns 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Simulated Time Paths, UK Stock Index Returns 
 
The simulated and historical stock index yield means and the standard deviations (SD) are 
compared in Table 4.9, while their correlations are compared in Table 4.10. The stock 
return time paths reported in Table 4.9 is the average of our 100 simulated time paths. 
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Table 4.12: Comparison of Simulated and Historical (1970-2014) Stock Indices 
Country US Hong Kong Japan UK Germany
Simulated 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.08
Historical 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.08 0.08
Difference 3.63% 1.52% 2.38% 0.60% 1.83%
Simulated 0.20 0.43 0.31 0.26 0.29
Historical 0.18 0.43 0.31 0.25 0.29
Difference -10.80% -1.44% -0.57% -2.39% -2.24%
Country France Spain Canada Australia 3MBOCB
Simulated 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.03
Historical 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.03
Difference 1.99% 0.95% -0.90% -0.23% -1.81%
Simulated 0.28 0.31 0.21 0.26 0.03
Historical 0.27 0.3 0.21 0.26 0.03
Difference -4.70% -2.58% -1.31% -0.79% -8.53%
Mean
S.D.
Mean
S.D.
 
 
Table 4.13: Comparison of Simulated and Historical (1970-2014) Stock Index 
Correlations 
Country US Hong Kong Japan UK Germany France Spain Canada Australia
US
Hong Kong 1.46%
Japan 5.72% 1.1%
UK 2.77% 0.75% 3.18%
Germany -2.33% -22.5% -13.6% -3.36%
France 7.96% 39.5% 27.1% 11.2% 2.22%
Spain 9.05% 7.82% 2.36% 10.4% -15.9% 26.9%
Canada 8.83% -5.25% -2.26% -3.24% -16.3% 20.0% 7.38%
Australia 7.75% -3.36% -2.73% -0.08% -23.0% 39.2% 6.26% -3.17%  
Following the assumptions laid out in Chapter 2, after retrieving a time path stock return, 
investors then calculate their optimal portfolio composition. In the simulation, a VBA 
program is used to solve the quadratic optimization problem, within Microsoft Excel© 
Solver©.  After the optimal financial portfolio is identified by assuming that the covariance 
between farmland yields and their optimal portfolio remains fixed, investors then derive 
their Sharpe Ratio (eq. 3.19). The optimal portfolio bundles are calculated externally for 
model simplicity. Then, the beta value, expected returns of the optimal portfolios and 
farmland are calculated following eq. 3.22. The expected returns of farmland in the optimal 
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portfolios are considered as model inputs. In the model simulation, these inputs are 
subsequently used in conjunction with the endogenously derived crop rents from the 
farmland rental markets to set their farmland bid prices following eq. 3.25. The bidding 
prices of the institutional investors are generated within the simulation.  
 
Historically, the Hong Kong Stock index tends to have a significantly higher mean return 
and variation, while the market indices in the US and Australia have comparatively lower 
return and risk. In addition, stocks in North America and Europe tend to have a stronger 
correlation with each other than with Asian stocks. Moreover, the indices for stocks of 
geographically proximate countries, such as France, Germany or Spain, are typically also 
more closely related. Here, the average difference between the simulated and historical 
mean index is less than 5%, while the difference of the S.D. is within 10%. The relative 
differences between our simulated and historical stock return correlations are generally 
within 25%. 
 
4.4.2 Simulated Future Commodity Prices and Yields 
Following Anderson (2012), stochastic farm variables used here include de-trended prices 
and yields for eight outputs. These are canola, wheat, durum, barley, flax, pea, lentil and 
hay and the price of calves. Graphs of farm yields and prices are displayed in Figures 4.6 
and 4.7 respectively. 
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Figure 4.6: Detrended CAR 1 yields, 1971 to 2014 (Source: Statistics Canada) 
 
 
Figure 4.7 De-trended farm commodity prices, 1971 to 2014 (Source: Statistics Canada)  
 
A similar process is used in estimating various future commodity yield and price time paths. 
Strong autocorrelation exists with canola prices. The adjusted R2 for an AR (1) estimate of 
the canola price is 50%, and the lagged price is significant at the 1% level. Canola prices 
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and yields have the highest correlations with other commodities, so canola was used as the 
base commodity for generating various output time paths, through repeated resampling.  
𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑎 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑎 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 +𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡 
(4.5) 
𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑎 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 = 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑎 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡 
(4.6) 
Where:  
             𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑎 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 is the simulated canola price in the period t, 
             𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑎 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 is the simulated canola price in the period t-1, 
             𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑎 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 is the simulated canola yield in the period t, 
             𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑎 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 is the simulated canola yield in the period t-1, 
             𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 is the historical price difference in historical period i, 
             𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 is the historical yield difference in historical period I and 
             𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡 is a stochastic error term from period t. 
 
Other yields and prices are generated based on eq. 4.7 and 4.8. Namely, the simulated price 
and yield of wheat that have the strongest correlation with canola are generated by a 
univariate equation of canola plus an error term, and the parameters are from the univariate 
OLS regression. Moreover, the simulated price and yield of the crop that have the second 
strongest correlation with canola are generated by a bivariate equation of canola and wheat 
plus an error term, and the parameters are from the bivariate OLS regression et cetera. The 
method is to keep the mean, variance and the correlation being similar to the historical 
values. In addition, there is no strong historical correlation between calf price and the other 
commodities, so it must be estimated separately. 
 
Likewise, future prices and yields for other crops are generated through the use of GARCH 
(1,0) processes, since the lag of returns squared is not statically significant in all cases: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +∑𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
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(4.7) 
𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖 +∑𝜏𝑗 ∗ 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
(4.8) 
Where: 
𝜇𝑖,𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 ) 
(4.9) 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2 = 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1,0) = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖 ∗ 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1
2  
(4.10) 
Where: 
           𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the price for grain i in the period t, 
           𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑗,𝑡 is the price for grain j in the period t, 
           𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the yield for grain i in the period t, 
           𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the yield for grain j in the period t, 
           𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is the error term for grain i in the period t, 
           𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2  is the variance of error term for the grain i until the period t-1, 
           𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2  is the variance of error term for the grain i until the period t-1 and  
           𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝜏𝑖, 𝛾𝑖, 𝜃𝑖  are the parameters estimated using OLS. 
 
4.4.2.1 Verification of Commodity Price and Yield Time Paths  
In lieu of cumbersome formal testing, by examining figures 4.8 to 4.11, it appears that the 
100 iterations of the simulation span these parameter spaces sufficiently to mimic reality. 
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Figure 4.8: Simulated Canola Yield Time Paths 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Simulated Canola Price Time Paths 
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Figure 4.10: Simulated Flax Price Time Paths 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Simulated Flax Yield Time Paths 
 
The simulated future farm data and the historical data are shown for comparison in Tables 
4.14 and 4.15. We note that the simulated means and standard deviations generally fall 
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Table 4.14: Comparison of Simulated and Historical Yields 
Canola Wheat Durum Flaxseed Lentils Peas Barley Hay
Simulated 26.7 31.2 31.2 18.4 29.7 42.3 50.7 1.78
Historical 27.2 31.6 31.7 18.6 29.1 43.2 51.2 1.77
Difference -1.86% -1.41% -1.47% -1.42% 2.17% -2.15% -1.17% 0.63%
Simulated 5.64 5.37 5.38 3.68 5.06 7.9 9.43 0.60
Historical 5.71 5.77 5.83 3.93 5.15 7.67 10.2 0.64
Difference -1.19% -6.87% -8.16% -6.38% -1.68% 3.03% -7.07% -5.55%
Yield
Mean
S.D.
 
  
Table 4.15: Comparison of Simulated and Historical Farm Commodity Prices  
Canola Wheat Durum Flaxseed Lentils Peas Barley Hay Calf
Simulated 9.14 4.71 5.52 21.1 19.6 8.75 10.3 67.7 1.53
Historical 8.55 4.71 5.45 19.4 19.4 8.84 9.51 67.6 1.49
Difference 6.84% 0.18% 1.33% 8.72% 1.08% -1.04% 8.68% 0.23% 2.65%
Simulated 2.45 1.54 2.14 9.38 8.56 2.53 3.79 14.5 0.38
Historical 2.51 1.56 2.22 8.68 8.68 2.52 3.91 14.2 0.40
Difference -2.34% -1.26% -3.77% 8.05% -1.45% 0.36% 2.14% 2.14% -3.27%
Price
Mean
S.D.
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CHAPTER V: SIMULATION RESULTS 
5.0 Introduction 
One of the primary objectives of this research is to assess the impact of institutional 
farmland purchases on the long-run structure of Saskatchewan farming. Currently, there 
are considerable limitations on non-Canadian farmland ownership (Table 2.1 and Table 
2.2). Allowing the entrance of institutional investors into Saskatchewan farmland markets 
can potentially disrupt farmland purchase and rental markets through the shift of land 
ownership to those outside the farm community. It is widely believed (see for example, 
Desmarais et al., 2016) that the shift of farm ownership to non-farm owners has several 
potential knock-on effects through its impact on the accumulation of farm equity and 
farmland control potentially affecting the ability to transfer land from one generation to the 
next.  
 
The study of farmland ownership is complicated by many factors including: 1) 
heterogeneous farmer demographics and expectations; 2) varying agricultural landscapes; 
and 3) uncertain yields, prices and government actions. The result is that the much of the 
underlying behavior and individual interactions in farming are too complex and recursive 
to be modeled using traditional static farm models. Accordingly, a farm level agent based 
simulation model (or ABSM) is extended to include individual farm and investor level 
decisions over agricultural production, farmland transactions and succession plans. As we 
shall see, the simulation generates results 30 years into the future. Four distinct scenarios 
are considered based on different levels of investor participation. In this manner, the long-
term effects of institutional investors and the interactions between investors and local 
farmers on farmland markets as well as agricultural performance can be observed. The 
long-run consequences of allowing outside investors to bid on and own farmland will be 
assessed based on changes in the structure and financial well-being of a synthetic 
population of farmer agents. These virtual agents are located on an actual landscape known 
as CAR 1A, a Census region located in southeastern Saskatchewan.  
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Assessing the consequences when allowing large institutional investors to compete for 
farmland purchases is a key part of our (counterfactual) analysis. But to start, a benchmark 
or base scenario (hereafter base) simulates the current market situation with limited 
institutional investors in the land market. My counterfactual analysis consists of re-
simulating the base model using the same time paths and length of model runs in order to 
generate three alternative policy scenarios. I then broadly compare the impact of each 
scenario on long-term agricultural structure as well as farm performance in comparison to 
the base scenario. 
 
The four scenarios are described in Table 5.1. Once again, the base scenario models the 
current situation with no outside investors allowed in farmland markets. 
 
Table 5.1:  Definitions of Four Simulating Scenarios 
Scenario Name Meaning
Base No Institutional Investor
II-BB Institutional Investors Only Bid for Big Plots (>4 Plots).
II-BP Institutional Investors Only Bid in Randomly 30% Auctions
II-BA Institutional Investors Bid for All Auctions  
 
The three scenarios called II-BB, II-BP and II-BA are grouped as “alternative scenarios” 
or “counterfactual scenarios” in this thesis. In Scenario II-BB, we assume that investors 
pursue high-efficiency purchases, meaning that small land parcels (less than four plots in 
size in the the simulation) are not worth purchasing and administering. In the second 
scenario, II-BP, we assume there are somewhat lowered barriers to land market entry by 
large investors, represented by certain regional farm community beliefs and customs. The 
latter might include exiting farmers who prefer to sell to neighbors, but the scenario also 
covers any limited informational resources on land for sale or even community peer 
pressure. Finally, Scenario II-BA allows unrestricted entry by institutional investors. While 
this is considered a somewhat unlikely future scenario, it is included to allow study of the 
extreme situation of fully open land markets in the province. Again, I run 100 simulations 
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for each scenario using the same sets of time paths of stock returns, grain yields and prices. 
In the following sections, I report on; 1) simulated farm production; 2) agricultural sector 
structure; 3) farmland purchasing and bidding market performance characteristics;  and 4) 
differences between the base and counterfactual scenarios. To this end, scenarios II-BB, 
II-BP and II-BA are compared using period means, long-trends and in a few cases extreme 
event analysis, where we test for relevant statistical differences using a paired T-test. 
 
5.1 Model Validation  
In Chapter 4, time path characteristics were compared to historical values in order to ensure 
that the set of time paths are a reasonable representation of potential future variable time 
paths. If the model performs to expectations in this sense, the next step in the simulation is 
model validation. The goal of model validation is to “guarantee that the results generated 
endogenously are correct and the model performs accurately” (Anderson, 2012). The first 
simulated year (2015) uses real values, so that the first year of the base scenario (i.e. no 
institutional investors) is compared to historical data to check whether the simulation 
generates results similar to those of reality.  
 
Table 5.2: Model Validation for First Simulated Year 
 Historical 
Data in 
2014 
 Simulated 
Data in 
2015 
 Difference 
 ($1,000)  ($1,000)  (%) 
 Assets 2,292        2,416        5.14%
 Debt 368           440           16.3%
 Net Worth 1,924        1,976        2.66%
 Gross Income 371           407           9.05%
 Net Operation 
Income 
60.8          61.7          1.55%
 Average Farm 
Value 
 
 
Looking at Table 5.2, we see that differences between historical and simulated financial 
data are generally within 10% of each other. In fact, the higher value of simulated assets 
and net worth can be explained by higher prices for farmland in CAR 1. Following 
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Anderson (2012), we generate debt value from a farm financial survey (see Appendix A). 
Note that this will not be a very precise comparison because the historical data are 
provincial averages, whereas the specific data for CAR 1A for 2014 are not available.  
Table 5.3: Simulated and Actual Crop Acreage Proportions in 2015 
 
 
The simulation model includes only beef cow, mixed and grain farms. For tractability in 
setting up the number of farmer agent types, we excluded other potential types of farms, 
such as dairy farms. From Table 5.3, we see that the simulated proportions of canola and 
lentil production are similar to actual production, while simulated wheat production 
(including spring wheat, winter wheat and durum) is 11.27% lower. As Anderson (2012) 
notes, this outcome could be the result of the exclusion of small farmers, farmers who 
mainly produce wheat using older technologies.  
 
5.2 Simulated Farms 
5.2.1 Farm Numbers and Size 
One of the major concerns voiced about the introduction of off-farm investors is the 
possible reduction in the total number of farms in the region. According to Desmarais et 
al. (2016), higher farmland prices will make it difficult for younger farmers to enter. 
However, based on the simulation these concerns may be overhyped. Table 5.4 shows 
simulated farm numbers over the 30-year simulation period. 
Year Statistic Wheat Canola Peas Flax Barley Lentils Fallow
Actual 28.43% 19.50% 3.95% 2.20% 3.51% 1.26% 12.72%
Simulated 17.15% 21.59% 19.90% 19.32% 17.62% 4.42% 0.00%
Difference -11.27% 2.08% 15.95% 17.12% 14.11% 3.16% -12.72%
2015
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Table 5.4 Simulated Farm Numbers 
Survival 
Percentage
Rate of 
Change
Lower 5% Upper 5%
(%) (%) (Number) (Number)
All Farms 717 367 51.2% -2.21% 263 450
Pure Grain 342 199 58.1% -1.80% 114 257
Pure Beef 144 83 57.5% -1.83% 61.7 103
Mix 231 86 37.2% -3.25% 68.3 103
All Farms 717 354 49.4% -2.32%* 252 434
Pure Grain 342 194 56.6% -1.88%* 109 256
Pure Beef 144 76 52.6% -2.12%* 56.7 93.4
Mix 231 85 36.7% -3.29%* 71.3 102
All Farms 717 351 49.0% -2.35%* 252 426
Pure Grain 342 191 55.7% -1.93%* 108 254
Pure Beef 144 77 53.6% -2.06%* 59.2 94.4
Mix 231 84 36.2% -3.33%* 69.2 97.8
All Farms 717 349 48.7% -2.37%* 255 424
Pure Grain 342 189 55.3% -1.96%* 112 252
Pure Beef 144 77 53.3% -2.08%* 57.3 90.4
Mix 231 83 36.0% -3.35%* 67.0 97.2
II-BA
Average
Ending
Farm 
Number
RangeBeginning 
Farm 
Number
Scenario Farm Type
Number of Farms
Base
II-BB
II-BP
 
Notes:  
1. The rate of change is the compound rate of this chapter as follow: 
Compound Changing Rate = 1 − (
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 30𝑡ℎ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟
)
1
30
 
2. Upper 5% is the average of the five highest values out of 100 simulations and lower 5% is the average of the five lower 
values out of 100 simulations in the class. 
3. * indicates 1% of statistical significance in paired T-tests. 
 
On average, approximately 50% of all farms in the region are projected to survive by the 
final (30th) year in the base scenario.  In the three alternative scenarios, farm survival 
rates are similar but slightly lower. But I note that the estimated simulated decline in 
mean farm numbers in fact follows past long-run provincial averages. The average annual 
rate of change for farm numbers in the province was 2.20%, from 1980 to 2016. 
(CANSIM 004-0001 and 004-0237). However, the decline in farm numbers depends on 
yield/price time paths, and varies from 250 to 450 farms indicating the importance of low 
prices and yields in predicting farm survival rates. In terms of farm types, pure grain and 
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pure beef (ranch) tended to have lower mean rates of decrease, dropping at about 1.8% 
per year. This resulted in about 58% of these farms surviving until the last period. Mixed 
farms displayed considerably higher exit rates than other farm types, averaging about 
3.2% per year, resulting in only 37% of these farms surviving by the last year of the 
simulation.   
 
Most farms in the simulation reduced farm debt over time. By the end of 30 years, 
approximately 50% of farms were successfully transferred or were still in business under 
the original owner. The approximately 50% of farms who did exit, did so for one of three 
reasons: 1) involuntary exit; 2) insufficient cash flow; and 3) farm succession failures 
(Table 5.5). These factors are examined in more detail in the next section. 
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Table 5.5: Simulated Farm Exits and Succession 
Lower 
5%
Total 
Exits
Upper 
5%
Proportio
n of Exits
(Number) (Number) (Number) (%)
Base 28.0 56.2 97.4 16.1%
II-BB 45.2 65.3 93.2 18.0%
II-BP 47.3 66.9 92.2 18.3%
II-BA 46.5 68.9 106 18.7%
Lower 
5%
Total 
Exits
Upper 
5%
Proportio
n of Exits
(Number) (Number) (Number) (%)
Base 123 175.3 250.4 50.1%
II-BB 123 177.7 256.6 49.0%
II-BP 122 180.0 259.6 49.3%
II-BA 129 180.1 254 48.8%
Lower 
5%
Total 
Exits
Upper 
5%
Proportio
n of Exits
(Number) (Number) (Number) (%)
Base 97.8 118 140 33.8%
II-BB 100 120 145 33.0%
II-BP 99.5 119 141 32.4%
II-BA 97.2 120 143 32.5%
Lower 
5%
Total
Upper 
5%
Proportio
n of First-
generatio
n Farmer
(Number) (Number) (Number) (%)
Base 281 360 408 20.2%
II-BB 276 348 401 20.1%
II-BP 278 348 396 20.3%
II-BA 275 346 395 20.2%
Scenario
Retire without Successor
Scenario
Successful Transfer
Scenario
Involuntary Exiting
Scenario
Insufficient Cash Flow
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Note: “Proportion of Exits” in Involuntary Exits is calculated as follow: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑠 =
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟
 
The other two ““Proportion of Exits” follow the same pattern. 
 
The number and percentage of exiting farms are presented in Table 5.5. Note that about 
20% of the farms operate for the entire 30 years. Namely, they do not exit, retire or pass 
the farm to a successor over the 30-year simulation period. Conversely, about 1.5% of the 
survival farms have experienced two rounds of successions (Table 5.7). Thus the total 
number of exits and successions is less than the initial farm number used here (717). 
 
In the base scenario, insufficient cash flow is the primary reason for 50% of farmers exiting, 
followed by retirement without a successor (33%) and involuntary exits (16%). Insufficient 
cash flows and involuntary exits together account for about 66% of all exits, reinforcing 
the importance of financing in long run farm survival. Insufficient cash flows are chronic 
cash flows that could be associated with too much farm debt service payments or a 
fundamental cost inefficiency due to the inability to reach a cost-efficient size (i.e. too 
much machinery with respect to farm size). Involuntary exits are due to technical 
bankruptcy likely caused by too much debt. In this model, farmer agent bid prices are based 
on a common set of bid rules but expectations, risk preferences and financial conditions 
are individual to each farmer agent. Hence, bid prices are heterogeneous and based on 
individual circumstances. Periods of increasing commodity prices can make farmers be 
optimistic about future prices. Likewise, periods of increasing farmland prices can also 
make farmers too aggressive through the so-called balance-sheet effect.12 If the farmer 
agent is too aggressive in bidding and overbids, then this can also lead to too much debt, 
making the farm vulnerable to technical insolvency in an economic downturn characterized 
by decreasing farm asset values. Likewise, too much debt can lead to increased debt service, 
                                                 
12 The balance-sheet effect is the higher capacity for the farmers to raise debts due to the increased value of 
the farmland as a composition of the assets. 
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in turn leading to chronic cash flow problems in a period of decreasing commodity prices 
or if increased interest rates are encountered.  
 
Farm succession (Section 3.3.2) only takes place when the retiring farmer has at least one 
heir, and there is at least one heir whose indicator of succession willingness (eq. 3.10) is 
greater than the chosen threshold of 0.8. Moreover, I assume that the heir with the highest 
willingness indicator takes over the whole farm. Over the simulation, there are between 
345 to 360 successful farm transfers across various scenarios, with 360 successful farm 
transfers on average in the base scenario over the whole simulation period.  
 
Considering the alternative scenarios and farm exit, there are small differences between the 
base and the three alternative scenarios. On average, there are 2-3% more exits per year in 
the scenarios that include institutional investors. However, in terms of the reasons for farm 
exits, I find little differences between the scenarios. Farm acreage is held constant within 
CAR 1A, so that farms are typically associated with land being farmed by the existing 
farms while farm size gradually increases over time. 
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Table 5.6: Simulated Farm Size, by Scenario 
Lower 5% Mean Upper 5%
Auunal 
Rate of 
Change
(Number) (Number) (Number) (Number) (%)
All Farms          1,533              2,432       2,946         4,116 2.20%
Pure Grain          1,636              2,395       3,410         6,866 2.48%
Pure Beef          1,928              1,812       3,046         4,002 1.54%
Mix          1,133              1,356       1,712         2,372 1.38%
All Farms          1,533              2,530       3,038         4,268 2.31%
Pure Grain          1,636              2,503       3,582         7,400 2.65%
Pure Beef          1,928              1,874       3,048         3,996 1.54%
Mix          1,133              1,329       1,766         2,286 1.49%
All Farms          1,533              2,560       3,072         4,386 2.34%
Pure Grain          1,636              2,551       3,659         7,713 2.72%
Pure Beef          1,928              1,826       3,027         4,255 1.52%
Mix          1,133              1,279       1,740         2,347 1.44%
All Farms          1,533              2,581       3,093         4,287 2.37%
Pure Grain          1,636              2,577       3,685         7,543 2.74%
Pure Beef          1,928              1,659       3,031         3,858 1.52%
Mix          1,133              1,357       1,767         2,397 1.49%
Base
II-BB
II-BP
II-BA
Scenario Farm Type Beginning
Ending
Average Farm Size
 
 
Note: Upper 5% is the average of the five highest values out of 100 simulations, and lower 5% is the average of the five lower values 
out of 100 simulations in the particular class. 
 
 
Average farmed, owned and leased acres per farm are presented in Table 5.6. Initially, 
with decreasing farm numbers, we eventually observe rapid farm size expansions. In the 
base scenario, we see there is 50% more owned farmland and 150% more rented land by 
the 30th year as compared to the beginning of the simulation. All three scenarios follow 
this basic trend.  
 
By the end of the base scenario, pure grain farms are 100% larger, and both pure beef and 
mixed farms are 50% larger than their initial size. The differences between different 
scenarios on this factor is actually insignificant. By the final simulation year, pure grain 
farms are more than twice as large as mixed farms. Based on growth rates with dwindling 
farm numbers, mixed farming does not appear to be a particularly efficient future strategy 
under these conditions. This finding on mixed farms is likely due to initial smaller annual 
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acreages, meaning fewer efficiencies can be gained with cow herd expansion beyond a 
certain size.  
 
The distribution of farm sizes is represented in the histogram in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Histogram of Farmed Acres, Initial and Final Years  
 
In Figure 5.1, at the beginning of the simulation, 99% of farms operate with less than 
5,000 acres. Compared to the initial year (in the base scenario) the number of small farms 
(defined here as less than 2,000 acres) decreases over time, while about 10% of farms by 
the final year are very large farms, farming more than 5,000 acres. Once again, there are 
few significant differences among the various scenarios. For example, slightly more 
farms of more than 30,000 acres are generated in the alternative scenarios (especially in 
II-BA) while more farms of under 20,000 acres are generated in the base scenario. We 
conclude that institutional investor owned farmland does affect farm size through 
allowing more farmland to be available for rent, but the overall difference is rather small 
as compared to the base scenario.  
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5.2.2 Farm Age Profile 
Farm expansion among each generation of farmers is critical for the farms to reach 
optimal size and efficiency. Table 5.7 presents the renewal situation for farmers in each 
scenario. 
Table 5.7: Age Structure in the Last (30th) Year of Simulation 
Scenario Generation Percentage
First 20.0%
Second 78.8%
Third 1.24%
First 20.1%
Second 78.6%
Third 1.25%
First 20.3%
Second 78.5%
Third 1.23%
First 20.2%
Second 78.5%
Third 1.31%
Base
II-BB
II-BP
II-BA
 
 
At the beginning of the simulation, all farmers are necessarily first generation. If a farmer 
transfers the farm to his/her heir (one succession), new farmers will then become a group 
of second generation farmers. Referring to Table 5.7, about 80% of the operating farms in 
the simulation experience at least one family transfer, whereby successful farm transfer 
means that most of the farmland remains under family control. The difference among 
scenarios with or without investors in this regard is very slight.  
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Figure 5.2: Histogram of Age Distribution in Year 0 and Year 30 
 
By the 30th year, age of the average farmer decreases from 51.1 to 47.1 in all three 
alternative scenarios. Farmers are allowed to consider retirement after age 55, but face 
80% or higher probability of retirement as they hit 70 years or older. In the initial year of 
the simulation, the density of senior farmers is higher than at the end. This is illustrated in 
Figure 5.2. As a result, farm age by the final simulation year is lower than at the 
beginning. From Figure 5.2., we see a larger proportion of young farmers in the 20-40 
age group and a lesser proportion of farmer in the 50 or over group through the final 
simulated years across all four scenarios. As a result, farm succession smoothly decreases 
the age distribution of farmers. 
 
5.2.3 Simulated Farm Tenure 
The ownership pattern of farmland is presented in Table 5.8. Initially, there is no 
significant difference among the four scenarios. In the base scenario, the proportion of 
owned farmland starts at about 69 percent and by the end only half of the farmland is 
owned by operating farms. As expected, more rental farmland is present in the three 
alternative scenarios. In scenarios II-BB, II-BP and II-BA, farmers operate with about 
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100 more leased acres per farm on average, which explains increasing crop production. 
Overall in all four scenarios, compared to the start of the simulation, there is about 30% 
more owned farmland and 100% more rental land at the end of the simulation.  
 
Leasing farmland is the primary business expansion mechanism for farmers with or 
without outside investors. The introduction of outside investors, however, pushes the 
farmers to rely slightly more on rented land due to rising farmland prices and a larger 
supply of rental land. When looking at 5% bounds of the land ownership distribution 
(Table 5.8), we find that the owned acreage ratio for all farm categories slides to the left 
(falls) by about 2% in all three alternative scenarios. 
 
Table 5.8: Simulated Farmland Owned Acreage Proportion 
Lower 5% Mean Upper 5%
(%) (%) (%) (%)
All Farms 68.9% 40.2% 50.7% 61.3%
Pure Grain 65.5% 33.5% 49.6% 62.3%
Pure Beef Cow 73.4% 36.5% 46.5% 67.4%
Mix 71.5% 48.4% 64.2% 80.3%
All Farms 68.9% 40.4% 49.9% 59.3%
Pure Grain 65.5% 34.0% 48.8% 59.4%
Pure Beef Cow 73.4% 36.1% 45.5% 66.0%
Mix 71.5% 49.6% 62.1% 80.6%
All Farms 68.9% 39.2% 49.2% 58.4%
Pure Grain 65.5% 32.0% 48.0% 61.6%
Pure Beef Cow 73.4% 33.6% 44.6% 66.1%
Mix 71.5% 46.1% 62.3% 79.5%
All Farms 68.9% 38.8% 48.7% 58.6%
Pure Grain 65.5% 31.1% 47.2% 60.9%
Pure Beef Cow 73.4% 34.5% 44.5% 67.6%
Mix 71.5% 45.0% 62.5% 79.1%
Owned Acreage Proportion
Base
II-BB
II-BP
II-BA
Scenario Farm Type
Ending
Beginning
 
 
Note: Upper 5% is the average of the five highest values out of 100 simulations, and lower 5% is the average of the five lower values 
out of 100 simulations in the particular class. 
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5.2.4 Simulated Farm Financial Structure 
In the base scenario, average assets per farm increase from $2.4 to $6.7 million while 
average net worth per farm increases from $1.9 to $6.4 million. This is shown in Table 
5.9. Overall, I offer that these numbers indicate that farming remains a sustainable and 
healthy industry. Also, in scenarios II-BB, II-BP and II-BA, given higher farmland prices 
in these scenarios, I find that asset and equity values are also higher. Meanwhile, the 
value of land is a part of property and equity - a higher farmland price leads to increased 
value and net worth properly. For instance, in II-BB the asset values are $100,000 
greater, while in II-BP an II-BA these values are $1 million higher on average. The 
increased asset values are due primarily to the rise in farmland price. 
 
Meanwhile, we see that the distributional range for asset and equity range from $4 
million to $10 million in the base scenario. The tails of the distribution indicate that farm 
performance continues to be very sensitive to prices and yields of farm products. 
Moreover, in the three alternative scenarios, the ranges of asset, equity and debt are even 
greater due to higher variations in farmland prices. In Figure 5.3, we see that more farms 
with greater than $5 million in assets are found in II-BB and II-BA because of increased 
farmland prices, as compared to more farms possessing less than $200,000 of assets in 
the base scenario. 
 
Referring to Anderson (2012), in this simulation I fixed machinery technology and 
investment requirements at 2014 levels. In turn, machines are replaced at a continuous 
rate, and as long as machine size and composition do not change, machine debt can 
effectively be rolled over with replaced machines. However, farm resizing can result in 
changing machinery size and changes in farm debt, and thus the need for debt repayment. 
Nevertheless, simulated farms here tended to pay off most of their farm debt. In the base 
scenario, the amount of farm debt declines from $4.92 to $2.74 million (Table 5.9). In 
fact, this slightly surprising result may be an artifact of our assumption of fixed 
machinery real prices and technology in the simulation.  
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On average, farm debt declines 1.3% to 1.5% annually in the three counterfactual 
scenarios, and 2% in the base scenario over the 30-year simulation period. The annual 
rate of change of the debt/asset ratio is -1.98%, which is very close to the historical rate 
of change for debt/asset ratio from 2001 to 2011 at -1.96% (Source: CANSIM 002-0065). 
However in reality, farm debt actually increased 3% per year in 2001 to 2011. 
  
This mismatch could be the result of the following. Initially, all farmers with a debt-asset 
ratio greater than 90% are immediately forced to exit, so survival bias might lead to the 
underestimation of the farm debt. Moreover, since I assumed no technology 
improvements over the simulation period, the capacity and price of machinery are fixed. 
As a result, more advanced machinery with higher prices is not a factor causing farmers 
to replace machinery and increase debt. Also, the increasing asset price can lead to debt 
to increase in the real world, but asset prices in the model are assumed to be fixed, except 
for farmland. The debt/asset ratio, however, is free of price volatility both in the 
simulation and in the real world. As a result, the validity of my simulation results are 
supported by a similar changing debt/asset ratio. 
 
From Table 5.5, we see more farms involuntarily exiting in the three alternative 
scenarios/ We also observe higher farmland prices in the three alternative scenarios. The 
average debt per farm in the alternative scenarios is $50,000 higher than in the base 
scenario (Table 5.9), where farmland price is higher but seemingly still affordable to 
remaining farmers. From Table 5.11, we see that a number of farmland purchases in these 
scenarios (II-BB and II-BP) are similar to the base scenario, so farms necessarily have a 
higher level of debt. But since the farmland price in scenario II-BA is eventually no 
longer as affordable for the remaining farms, the average amount of debt is actually 
lower. 
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Increased debt levels could lead to potentially greater financial problems as high 
farmland prices are not associated with greater productivity. Paying increasing amounts  
for farmland adversely affects farm cash flows and does not confer additional real wealth 
until the land is sold. Nevertheless, this impact is still not significant here because; 1) a 
relatively large proportion of farmland rolls over from one generation to the next; and 2) 
the farmland purchased by institutional investors enters the land rental market, meaning 
farm expansion through rental is less risky and easier than expanding by land purchases.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Farm Assets in Initial and Last Year, all scenarios 
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Figure 5.4: Average Annual Change of Net Worth, all Scenarios  
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Table 5.9: Simulated Farm Assets, Debt and Net Worth 
Lower 
5%
Mean
Upper 
5%
Lower 
5%
Mean
Upper 
5%
Lower 
5%
Mean
Upper 
5%
 ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000)  ($1,000) 
All Farms       2,416       4,933       6,684 10,713           492         210         274         829 1,924     4,593     6,411     10,184   
Pure Grain       3,606       6,216       8,798 17,530           628         381         363       1,445 2,979     5,630     8,434     16,608   
Pure Beef Cow       1,880       3,996       4,585 5,327             627           72         195         436 1,254     3,879     4,390     5,102     
Mix         985       3,386       3,679 4,269             209        65.4         127         271 776        3,292     3,553     4,130     
All Farms       2,416       4,993       7,103     12,851         492         297         330       1,061 1,924     4,662     6,773     12,182   
Pure Grain       3,606       6,350       9,432     21,836         628         402         450       1,876 2,979     5,833     8,982     20,626   
Pure Beef Cow       1,880       3,693       4,823       5,844         627        73.4         226         478 1,254     3,579     4,596     5,625     
Mix         985       3,315       3,806       4,610         209        61.2         142         322 776        3,194     3,664     4,463     
All Farms       2,416       5,387       7,689     11,796         492         290         322       1,087 1,924     5,078     7,367     11,400   
Pure Grain       3,606       6,993     10,509     19,219         628         416         441       1,497 2,979     6,534     10,068   18,622   
Pure Beef Cow       1,880       3,730       4,871       5,305         627        60.1         214         486 1,254     3,585     4,657     5,109     
Mix         985       3,241       3,861       4,402         209        70.1         144         329 776        3,136     3,717     4,231     
All Farms       4,939       4,939       7,755     13,638         492         274         318         886 1,924     4,650     7,437     13,049   
Pure Grain       6,277       6,277     10,778     21,307         628         483         434       1,633 2,979     5,835     10,344   20,351   
Pure Beef Cow       3,941       3,941       4,665       6,641         627           57         194         381 1,254     3,796     4,471     6,368     
Mix       3,150       3,150       3,738       4,861         209           63         147         302 776        3,043     3,591     4,650     
Scenario Farm Type
Average Farm Assets Average Farm Debt Average Farm Net Worth
Beginning
Ending
Beginning
Ending
Beginning
Ending
II-BA
Base
II-BB
II-BP
Note: Upper 5% is the average of the five highest values out of 100 simulations, and lower 5% is the average of the five lower values out of 100 simulations in the particular class. 
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5.2.5 Farm Production 
From Table 5.10, we see that average cropping and pasture acreages per farm increase by 
100% for all four scenarios. On average, the size of existing farms doubled over the 
duration of the simulation. That is mostly due to the fact that 50% of the simulated farms  
at the start ultimately exited.  
 
Compared with the base scenario, average cropping acreages in all three counterfactual 
scenarios increased between 70 to 110 acres, with more cropping acres per farm in II-BA 
than the other scenarios. Note that farmland price in II-BA is also higher than any of the 
other scenarios (Table 5.12), and the owned farmland proportion is the smallest for all 
four scenarios (Table 5.8). As a result, increased cropping acreage must come from 
additional rental farmland available through the institutional investor owners.  
 
Overall, farmland that would be owned by institutional investors does not “plunder” 
farmland resources from farmers. Instead, the capacity for farm expansion will be greater 
than we find under the base scenario, and productivity will also be higher due to the 
continued exploitation of increasing returns to scale at the farm level. Farmers will 
ultimately rely more on rented land to expand their farms, while the marginal expenditure 
for rented farmland remains considerably lower than for purchased farmland. Moreover, 
since institutional investors in the simulation will always rent their owned farmland to 
farmers, rental farmland supply is comparatively stable.  
 
In terms of sector average, there is more idle land in the three alternative scenarios than 
in the base scenario. As mentioned in Section 3.4.3.3, land bid prices for institutional 
investors are directly related to the performance of international stock indices. When the 
performance of these stock indices is poor, institutional investors buy very little farmland. 
But reservation land prices and renting by remaining land owners both increase due to 
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growing land price levels. This eventually can lead to more idle farmland because of the 
occasionally large bid and ask spreads that can occur in the land market. 
 
Table 5.10: Simulated Crop, Hay and Beef Cow Production 
 Beginning  Ending  Rate of Change  Beginning  Ending 
(Acre) (Acre) (%) (1,000 Acres) (1,000 Acres)
Base 1,275          2,948     2.31% 846                  839                
II-BB 1,275          2,997     2.43%* 843                  835                
II-BP 1,275          3,049     2.46%* 843                  837                
II-BA 1,275          3,076     2.49%* 842                  810                
 Beginning  Ending  Rate of Change  Beginning  Ending 
(Acre) (Acre) (%) (1,000 Acres) (1,000 Acres)
Base 136            258        2.23% 97.4                 185                
II-BB 136            265        2.25%* 97.4                 190                
II-BP 136            269        2.31%* 97.4                 193                
II-BA 136            271        2.33%* 97.4                 194                
 Beginning  Ending  Rate of Change  Beginning  Ending 
(Head) (Head) (%) (1,000 Heads) (1,000 Heads)
Base 78.3           54.9       -1.21% 29.3                 9.26               
II-BB 78.3           55.4       -1.15% 29.4                 8.90               
II-BP 78.1           55.2       -1.15% 29.3                 8.87               
II-BA 78.3           56.7       -1.07%* 29.4                 8.43               
Scenario
Grain Production Acreage
Farm Average Sector Average
Scenario
Hay Production Acreage
Farm Average Sector Average
Scenario
Beef Cow Head
Farm Average Sector Average
 
Note:  
1. * indicates 1% of statistical significance in paired T-test, 
2. The average grain production acreage is the average of pure grain and mixed farms, and the 
average hay production and beef cow head is the average of pure beef and mixed farms. 
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5.3 Farmland Auction 
5.3.1 Farmland Transactions 
Apart from farm financial and operational well-being, the perception is that a healthy 
agricultural industry is also dependent on farmland purchase and rental prices. In effect, 
high farmland prices can impede farms from expanding and reaching overall efficiency. 
Desmarais et al. (2016) argue that one of the major concerns in allowing off-farm 
investors is that investors will tend to overbid versus local farmers, pushing up farmland 
price and eventually squeezing the farmers out of the land market. Comprehensive 
farmland market performance from the simulation can be found in Tables 5.11, 5.12, as 
well as Figures 5.5 and 5.6. 
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Table 5.11: Simulated Number of Plots Purchased by Farmers and Investors 
Lower 5% Mean Upper 5% Lower 5% Mean Upper 5%
(Number) (Number) (Number) (Number) (Number) (Number)
Base NA NA NA 54.0 125 248
II-BB 5.33 58.4 170 55.3 130 232
II-BP 62.7 124 284 61.8 124 221
II-BA 193 399 719 26.5 85.2 179
Lower 5% Mean Upper 5% Lower 5% Mean Upper 5%
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Base NA NA NA 4.91% 11.3% 22.5%
II-BB 0.49% 5.31% 15.5% 5.03% 11.8% 21.1%
II-BP 5.70% 11.3% 25.8% 5.63% 11.3% 20.1%
II-BA 17.6% 36.3% 65.5% 2.41% 7.75% 16.3%
Lower 5% Mean Upper 5% Lower 5% Mean Upper 5%
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Base NA NA NA 100% 100% 100%
II-BB 7.76% 31.1% 61.1% 38.9% 68.9% 92.2%
II-BP 33.8% 50.1% 66.1% 33.9% 49.9% 66.2%
II-BA 67.7% 82.4% 93.9% 6.10% 17.6% 32.3%
Total Purchased Plots/Total Plots
Scenario
Investors Farmers
Total Purchased Plots/Total Sold Plots
Scenario
Investors Farmers
Total Plot Purchases
Scenario
Investors Farmers
 
 
Note: Upper 5% is the average of the five highest values out of 100 simulations, and lower 5% is the average of the five lower values 
out of 100 simulations in the particular class. 
 
In II-BA, total farmland purchases by investors are greater than the other two 
counterfactual scenarios, while total plot purchases are also about 100% greater than found 
in II-BB and II-BP. In the base scenario, II-BB and II-BP, institutional investors have 
constrained accessibility to farmland auctions, and most farmland is initially unsold, being 
retained by exiting farmers and passing to the rental market where it is eventually sold. II-
BA institutional investors bid in every farmland purchasing auction and are not constrained 
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by capital, and as a consequence, there is little to no unsold farmland. As a result, much 
more successful farmland transactions are observed in II-BA. 
 
The average amount of land bought by both investors and farmers over the 30–year 
simulation period is shown in Table 5.11. In the base scenario, about 125 plots of farmland 
are sold to farmers. Investors in II-BB and II-BP purchase 58 and 124 plots on average. 
Although the farmland price increases in II-BB and II-BP, farmers purchase as much 
farmland as compared to the Base scenario. On average, farmland price increases between 
$150-$300 in scenarios II-BB and II-BP (Figure 5.5). The same level of farmland is 
purchased by farmers in II-BB and II-BP. This indicates that farmland in these scenarios, 
especially low-quality farmland, is still affordable to farmers, but purchasing farmers will 
be burdened with more debt, as shown in Table 5.9. In II-BA, farmland is less affordable 
for farmers, so the amount of purchased farmland of farms drops by 40 simulated plots. 
 
In II-BA, institutional investors buy 82% of farmland on the market on average, and 
farmers are effectively squeezed out from the market, pushing them to leasing for farm 
expansion. Moreover, the institutional investors take 36.3% of the total farmland in the 
CAR1A region, significantly affecting farmland ownership structure. Also in the upper 5% 
of the simulation runs the investors had already purchased about two-thirds of the whole 
area. However, I remind the reader that II-BA is considered as an extreme case that is very 
unlikely to happen even if all the farmland ownership regulations are removed.  
 
Even though institutional investors purchase between 30% and 80% of farmland depending 
on the scenario, their ownership share of total farmland averages only between 5% and 11% 
of the total available acreage due to several factors, including: 1) scenario acreage limit 
restrictions; and 2) the amount of farmland transferred via succession from one farming 
generation to the next. Recall that annual acreage restrictions were relaxed in scenario II-
BA, meaning that institutional investors purchase almost all the farmland, so that their land 
share reached an average of 36.3% by the end of the simulation period. 
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5.3.2 Farmland Prices and Rents 
Simulated farmland prices and rents over the simulation are presented in Figures 5.5 and 
5.6, and in Table 5.12. At the beginning of the simulation, both farmland price and rents 
decline. In the base scenario, farmland price drops to $1,100/acre within the first few years. 
The price represents the agricultural value of farmland with technology standards found in 
the year 2014. The farmland price then becomes stable since I assume there is no 
technology improvement and yield increases over the simulation period. 
 
I observe greater price variability in II-BP, but by 2030 both price and rent stabilize. The 
main reason for farmland price declines is likely due to my initial condition assumptions: 
initial farmland prices were likely too high to be sustained by those initial commodity 
market conditions, and it was only as farm commodity prices regained historical levels that 
farmland prices eventually rebounded.  
 
Since all scenarios use the same time path data, any land use differences between the 
scenarios must come from competition within the farm auctions. It is also clear from Figure 
5.5 that increased investor auction participation drives up average farmland prices. For 
example, in the base scenario, average farmland price is found to be $1,184 per acre, about 
$100 less than that in II-BB and more than $200 than that in II-BP, while the average 
farmland price in II-BA is about $1,596 per acre. 
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Figure 5.5: Simulated Mean Farmland Price 
 
Note: Prices are detrended for inflation and embedded technology. 
 
 
The average farmland price per acre within the simulation time frame is shown in Figure 
5.5. Farmland rent among the four scenarios is very similar (Figure 5.6). Somewhat 
surprisingly, although farmland prices are significantly different across the scenarios, I find 
little difference among average farmland rents. This likely occurs for the following reasons. 
Initially, farmer rent bid values depend on their estimated future crop yields, and prices do 
not change between the various scenarios since the employed time paths are the same. 
Although the farmers bidding in the land auctions may change across scenarios and thus 
bids may change somewhat, the effects are not likely to be very dramatic. As more 
farmland is introduced into rental markets, there is more farmland available, and 
concurrently there are more renters bidding as unsuccessful farmers from purchase auctions 
will still want to grow their farms. The net result seems to be remarkably little differences 
generated in the farmland rental markets across all the scenarios.  
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Given this, what does change are land rent-price ratios. In all three of the alternative 
scenarios, land rent-price ratios are significantly lower than the base scenario because of 
the increase in farmland purchase prices.  
 
 
Figure 5.6: Simulated Mean Cropland Rent 
 
Note: Prices are detrended for inflation and embedded technology. 
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Table 5.12: Simulated Farmland Price and Rent 
5% Lower Mean 5% Upper
(Dollar) (Dollar) (Dollar) (Dollar) (Dollar)
Base 1,526     1,184     924        1,187     1,661        
II-BB 1,526     1,356     1,135     1,308     1,737        
II-BP 1,526     1,498     1,255     1,570     1,991        
II-BA 1,526     1,596     1,257     1,635     2,163        
5% Lower Mean 5% Upper
(Dollar) (Dollar) (Dollar) (Dollar) (Dollar)
Base 57.0 45.0 33.2 41.3 61.8
II-BB 57.0 45.1 33.8 39.9 63.3
II-BP 57.0 46.0 34.7 41.5 64.6
II-BA 57.0 45.1 34.8 42.4 61.4
5% Lower Mean 5% Upper
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Base 3.74% 3.80% 2.55% 3.48% 5.24%
II-BB 3.74% 3.33% 2.43% 3.05% 4.18%
II-BP 3.74% 3.07% 2.36% 2.64% 3.67%
II-BA 3.74% 2.83% 2.31% 2.59% 3.40%
Scenario
Farmland Rent
Beginning
Period 
Mean
Ending
Farmland Price
Beginning
Period 
Mean
Ending
Scenario
Scenario
Farmland Rent
Beginning
Period 
Mean
Ending
 
 
Note: 
1.  Prices are detrended for inflation and embedded technology. 
2. Upper 5% is the average of the five highest values out of 100 simulations, and lower 5% is the average of the five lower 
values out of 100 simulations in the particular class. 
 
 
5.4 Institutional Investor Behavior 
Apart from the farmers, the performance of off-farm investors is important to examine so 
as to understand the validity and motivation of the off-farm investors to hold farmland in 
their portfolios. The optimal portfolio performance for my three hypothetical investor 
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agents is presented in Table 5.13. The impact of adding farmland to their investment 
portfolio is measured by changes in their Sharpe Ratio, i.e. the return/risk ratio (eq. 3.19 
and 5.1).  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑅(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜) − 𝑟
𝑆𝐷(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑜)
 
(5.1) 
Note that it is important to assess this ratio for the investors as it is critical from their 
perspective to understand both expected return and risk. Improvements in the Sharpe 
Ratio indicate an increase of the return-risk ratio in their portfolios. Investors prefer this, 
as it means their chosen portfolios are less risky but with the same level of expected 
return, or alternatively the portfolio has a higher return for a given level of risk. 
 
The Sharpe Ratio Improvement is calculated as follow: 
Sℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
=  
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 − 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 
×100% 
(5.2) 
 
Both median and mean changes in the Sharp Ratio are reported in Table 5.13. The 
median might be a more reliable indicator since it mitigates against the influence of 
extreme values. Especially when the Sharpe Ratio computed without farmland is negative 
or slightly positive with farmland, improvement in the Sharpe Ratio could be 
overestimated. For example, if the Sharpe Ratio without farmland is -5% and the Sharpe 
Ratio with farmland is 1%, the indicator of improvement would be 600% following eq. 
5.2 as an extreme value. 
 
As there are no institutional investors in the base scenario, this scenario is used to identify 
any additional benefits to the institutional investors if they purchased farmland. When it 
is beneficial for investors to hold farmland in our alternative scenarios, they will 
participate in the farmland auctions. In the alternative scenarios including institutional 
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investors, Sharpe Ratios improved by 4% -5%. Moreover, 21% to 22% of agricultural 
land is part of the optimal portfolio for three institutional investor agents. We conclude 
that investors will likely be aggressive in participating in farmland auctions13.  
 
                                                 
13 Note that in the real world, these investors would face a much more expansive portfolio including non-
farm real estate. We offer that in a more expansive portfolio farmland would likely comprise a smaller 
proportion of the total portfolio.  
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Table 5.13 Institutional Investors Median Performance Comparison in the Ending (30th) Year 
Sharpe Ratio 
Improvement
Percentage of 
Farmland in 
Optimal Portforlio
Sharpe Ratio 
Improvement
Percentage of 
Farmland in 
Optimal Portforlio
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Full Investor 4.66% 20.7% 15.8% 27.4%
Non Asian Investor 4.26% 19.8% 23.6% 28.4%
North American Investor 5.34% 18.6% 45.6% 29.3%
Full Investor 6.05% 22.3% 16.7% 28.6%
Non Asian Investor 5.61% 21.8% 23.7% 29.7%
North American Investor 7.71% 22.3% 40.8% 26.2%
Full Investor 4.55% 20.0% 16.4% 26.1%
Non Asian Investor 3.81% 19.7% 26.2% 27.1%
North American Investor 5.63% 20.7% 44.4% 29.0%
II-BA
Mean
Investor Agent TypeScenario
II-BB
II-BP
Median
 
Note: 
The definitions of investor agent types can be found in Table 3.1. 1) Full Investor: This investor agent can buy all of the ten international stock indices, 2) Non-
Asian Investor: This investor agent cannot buy Nikkei (Japan) and Hang Seng (Hong Kong) Indices and 3) This Investor agent can only buy NASDAQ and TSX 
(Canada) Stock Indices. 
 
 
1
1
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5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the simulation results. The base scenario is used as 
a control to help evaluate the consequences associated with the introduction of 
institutional land investors in the three alternative scenarios. The introduction of 
institutional investors raises farmland prices because they bring financial asset valuation 
to this land market. Increased farmland prices can, in turn, lead to higher farm debt, with 
slightly more involuntary exits of farmers. On the other hand, the introduction of 
institutional investors provides more capital for retired farms. I find that remaining farms 
will operate on more rented land to increase farm scale over the duration of the 
simulation with or without institutional investors. As a result, off-farm investors have 
minimal influence on farm expansion because farmland rents are very similar among four 
scenarios. 
 
We find that farm succession keeps significant amounts of farmland within the control of 
extant farmers, at least for the period studied. In the simulation, 80% of the remaining 
farms experienced at least one round of successful farm succession. We also find that 
even if investors take unrealistically active roles in the Saskatchewan farmland market, 
their proportion of owned farmland is never more than 12%, save for the most aggressive 
or extreme investor scenario (II-BA), where the proportion was found to be as high as 
36.3%.  
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CHAPTER VI: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary 
The basic structure of Anderson’s (2012) agent-based simulation model is retained, but in 
this thesis I add two important model computational modules: 1) a module describing 
institutional investor agents as well as their participation in farmland markets, and 2) a 
detailed module of inter-generational farm succession. In the institutional investor 
module, heterogeneous institutional investors buy and hold farmland in order to improve 
the efficiency of their portfolios with different asset preferences. In this capacity, they bid 
against farmers and other institutional investors in auctions for farmland. After 
purchasing farmland, the institutional investors lease farmland back to the remaining 
farms. In the farm succession module, once a senior farmer decides to retire, he/she turns 
to his/her heirs whose gender, off-farm income and age are simulated based on actual 
current demographics. Subsequently, each simulated heir determines his/her willingness 
to take over the farm based on a formula (generated using a survey). In the end, one and 
only one heir with the highest willingness takes over the whole farm, and the new 
younger farmer replaces the senior farmer. Otherwise if there are no farm heirs, for 
example, the farm then exits the industry, and the retiring farmer’s land passes into the 
farmland auction market.  
 
Major stochastic variables in the model include seven crops (i.e. yields) and associated 
commodity prices. These include annual crop, hay and cattle prices as well as ten major 
world stock indices. In the bootstrap style process used to generate data for the 
simulation, farm crop yields are assumed to be correlated with each other but temporally 
independent of commodity prices and stock indices and autocorrelated with stock indices. 
World stock indices are also both autocorrelated and correlated with each other. A total 
of one hundred time paths, comprising 30 years of farm prices and yields are generated in 
this manner to be used in the simulation analysis. 
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Four different scenarios are developed using the simulation code and the data. These are, 
1) no institutional investors (called the base); 2) institutional investor bidding on big land 
plots (II-BB); 3) institutional investors bidding on any farmland available, but limited to a 
30% probability of entering the auction (II-BP); and 4) institutional investor bidding in 
every farmland auction (II-BA). As mentioned, each scenario is run 100 times over a 30 
year simulation period using identical time paths of the generated data as input. A 
summary table of the 30 year simulation results can be found in Table 6.1. 
 
Assuming transparent farmland auctions, compared to the base scenario, the participation 
of institutional investors drives up farmland prices. On average, farmland price per acre 
increases by $100 (to about $450) versus when investors are excluded from bidding. 
However, farmland rental values do not change significantly. As a result, increasing 
farmland prices motivate farms to gradually concentrate more on available rental land 
when considering production expansion. Due to falling rental costs as well as stable 
rental land supply with the presence of investors, we find that in all three alternative 
scenarios with institutional investors, higher farm assets and net worth are realized as 
well as slightly higher grain production. However, higher borrowing capacity caused by 
higher asset value leads to slightly more bankrupted farms in the alternative scenarios. 
Not surprisingly, we also find that holding farmland improves the portfolio structure of 
institutional investors through the simulation era.
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Table 14: Summary of 30-year Simulation Results: 2014 and 2044 
Involuntary 
Exits
Insufficient 
Cash
No 
Successor
Successfu
l Transfer
Farm Size
% of Owned 
Acreage 
(Year) (Number) (Number) (Number) (Number) (Acres) (%)
51.1 717 1,533    68.90%
Base 47.1 368 56.2 175 118 360 2,946    50.7%
II-BB 47.1 355 65.3 178 120 348 3,038    49.9%
II-BP 47.1 352 66.9 180 119 348 3,072    49.2%
II-BA 47.1 349 68.9 180 120 346 3,093    48.7%
Farm Asset Farm Debt
Farm 
Equity
Farmland 
Price
Farmland 
Rent
CAR 1A
Land on 
Market
($1 Million) ($1 Million) ($1 Million) (Acres) ($) ($) (%) (%)
2.42 0.49 1.94 1,275     1,526      57.0
Base 6.68 0.27 6.41 2,948     1,184      45.0 NA NA
II-BB 7.10 0.33 6.78 2,997     1,356      39.9 5.31% 31.1%
II-BP 7.69 0.32 7.37 3,049     1,498      41.5 11.3% 50.0%
II-BA 7.76 0.32 7.44 3,076     1,596      42.4 36.3% 82.4%
Year Scenario
Year Scenario
Farmer Age
NA
2044
2044
2014
2014
Farm Exits and Transfer Land Tenure
Farm Finance
Grain 
Acreage
Farmland Market
 Proportion of Investor-
purchased Land 
Farm 
Number
NA
 
Note:  
1. The average grain production acreage is the average of pure grain and mixed farms. 
2. The proportion of Investor-owned Land is the percentage of farmland being bought by the investors. 
3. CAR 1A under “Proportion of Investor-owned Land” is the proportion of farmland in the simulating area (CAR 1A) held by the investors by the 
year 2044. 
4. Land on Market under “Proportion of Investor-owned Land” is as follow:  
Land on market =  
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒
 
1
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The major differences among the scenarios are farmland prices, land tenure and numbers 
of farms. In general, with higher farmland prices, we observe a greater proportion of 
rented land as well as reduced farm numbers overall, along with more intensive investor 
participation in the farmland purchase market. But overall, the introduction of outside 
investors does not seem to adversely affect the profitability of the farming sector.  
 
The process of farm succession used here keeps much of the extant farmland under farm 
ownership. On average, more than 80% of the surviving farms in the simulation 
experience at least one round of family succession, while survivors tend to have larger 
and more efficient farms with the use of available rented land. Moreover, likely due to 
the initial data we used indicating that older farmers are more likely to operate smaller 
farms, we find the average simulated farmer age eventually drops from 51 to 47 years. 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
Under the most extreme model assumptions for investor behavior, I find that unconstrained 
institutional investing in farmland (counterfactual II-BA) will eventually dominate 
regional farmland ownership (controlling 36.3% of available farmland). However, this 
shift does not seem to affect overall farmer financial well-being or operations. Offsetting 
the presence of institutional investors is the fact that farm succession still keeps the 
majority of simulated farmland under farmer control, while the gradual shift from 
purchasing to renting farmland protects farms from being harmed by gradually rising 
farmland prices. Even in the II-BA scenario where institutional investors purchase 
considerable amounts of farmland, they appear to have limited impact on farming per se. 
A summary of the effects generated by institutional investors is presented in Table 6.2. 
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Table 15: Effects of Institutional Investors on Agriculture 
Market Attendent Effect
Institutional Investors Better Portfolio Efficiency
Retired Farmers More Retire Pension from Farmland Selling
Existing Farmers Cheaper Access for Expansion
Farm Successors No Significant Impact  
 
I also find that institutional investors can generate better portfolio bundles (as shown in 
Table 5.14) and in general, their investment portfolio becomes about 5% better off, in 
terms of the Sharpe Ratio (return/risk ratio). Of course, retired or exiting farmers also 
gain by rising farmland prices. In the simulation, remaining farmers adjust to increasing 
farmland purchase prices by gradually shifting from land ownership to land rental for 
farm expansion, ultimately building up their final net worth.  
 
The introduction of institutional investors into farmland purchase markets pushes up 
farmland prices but this possibility seems to have a minimal impact on farming in terms 
of sectoral production and overall farm financial health. However, it does eventually shift 
farm expansion towards reliance on land rentals.  
 
In essence, increased farmland values increase the value of farmland already owned as 
well as the farmer’s ability to borrow against their land, but through the simulation, it 
becomes gradually more difficult to purchase farmland, a situation that could potentially 
lead to increased farm debt and associated greater risk of bankruptcy. That this does not 
occur in the simulation appears to be due to two effects. These are: 1) the role of 
farmland succession from one generation to the next, providing wealth and stability to 
those who remain in farming; and 2) the (assumed) relative stability of farmland rental 
markets that are under investor control.  
 
Given the latter situation, the overall impact of institutional investors on future farming 
will necessarily be subtle. Continued farm success will be contingent on farmers being 
willing to adapt and rely more on rented land for farm expansion. However, the assumption 
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made here about open land rental access and the transparency of farmland rental auctions 
is significant. If a higher level of price discrimination or informational/transaction costs are 
somehow placed on the external investors in the land market, this can create an additional 
cost to renting farmland that could affect how easy I assumed farmers could rent investor 
purchased farmland. Thus the provision of a transparent farmland market, as opposed to 
one that prevents or blocks external investment appears to be another way to promote 
higher farmland valuation, greater farm wealth and positive agricultural sector 
development. On the other hand, once land price inflates due to the presence of investors, 
farm loan providers will need to be wary in evaluating farm borrowing capacity since 
increased farm asset value will no longer be associated with increased farm productivity. 
Furthermore, one last potential problem with investors is that because of their decision 
making processes, institutional investors will almost certainly generate noticeable variation 
in farmland prices. 
 
Finally, we hope the reader agrees that agent based simulation modeling (ABSM) is a 
useful agricultural economic methodology that can help shed light on potential structural 
changes in agriculture. These include allowing the researcher to track simulated farm 
numbers, individual financial positions and farm productivity, as well as overall 
agricultural system stability. Heterogeneity in both landscape and agents, along with the 
inherent dynamics of farm agent behavior and the set of external random variables, the 
complex interactions among different agents and external inputs all combine to create a 
complex economic system. Given these factors, the use of ABSM is necessary in order to 
bettter understand and forecast future real world outcomes. 
 
6.3 Limitations 
There are several key limitations that constrained this research. To start, institutional 
investors are assumed to hold and never sell all owned farmland over the duration of the 
simulation. Although there is no publicly available data showing any farmland investors 
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selling farmland in Saskatchewan, and chances are that another institutional investor 
instead of a farmer will buy the land, it is still possible that investors might sell their 
farmland to incorrect expectations. In addition, due to time constraints, farmland 
speculators are not allowed in the investor module. Their presence in reality is certainly 
possible because of the limited liquidity of farmland. In any case, as a result the 
simulation likely underestimates farmland price fluctuations that could arise after the 
introduction of institutional investors. 
 
In reality, institutional investors are not likely to participate in all large plot sales or even 
limit their bidding on some fixed proportion (say 30%) of land auctions. As a result, the 
alternative scenarios likely overestimate the activities of institutional investors. 
Meanwhile, our choice of just three investor agents in the model might be insufficient to 
represent all potential global investors, while investor asset bundles could expand to 
broader investments such as futures and urban real estate. The next iteration of this model 
requires a more reasonable and defensible participation level of institutional investors, 
requiring at a minimum additional investor agents along with other assets in their 
portfolios.  
 
A complete representation of farm succession should also include asset prices because 
higher farmland prices with investors might attract more heirs into taking over family 
farms. Moreover, retired farmers might wait for these farmland price increases. Future 
research should consider farmers’ speculative expectations as part of the succession 
module. 
 
Due to limits of computational capacity as well as data availability, the area researched 
was restricted to the CAR1A region in Saskatchewan. In fact, it is highly likely that 
farmland and farmland markets differ considerably across different regions even within 
Saskatchewan, much less across different Canadian provinces. As a result, the limited 
representativeness of CAR1A restricts the broader applicability of this study and my 
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results, meaning that moving forward ideally the researched area should be expanded to 
include the whole province. 
 
Technology improvements and climate change factors are explicitly not included in the 
simulation, and therefore the generated farmland prices across the four scenarios are 
relatively stable. However, technological improvements will increase long-run farmland 
prices because of increases in net income (Klinefelter, 1973) and it is also highly likely 
climate change consequences will also have an effect on farmland values through the 
modelled era (Darwin, 1999). Hence, if institutional investors are introduced into land 
markets, farmers will have to share land value appreciation with investors, but of course 
their originally owned land will also be more valuable. As a result, whether farmers can 
appropriate any land value appreciation is still difficult to know. In future research, 
different scenarios comprising technology improvements as well as climate change need 
to be introduced to help address their effects on farm structure. 
 
Finally, the software (Repast©) used for the simulation had both positives and negatives 
for this researcher. While incredibly flexible for research applications, Repast is not 
nearly as user-friendly as some other more popular agent based software such as 
Netlogo© or AnyLogic©. To code in Repast, Java language knowledge is required, and 
this knowledge had to be gained as the research progressed. At times some assistance was 
needed with more detailed programming tasks. And due to limited time and resources, 
my coding in many instances is not particularly computationally efficient, meaning it 
takes a non-trivial amount of computational time to simply run through the simulation. In 
the future, I am sure that coding improvements would be helpful to save model run time.
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APPENDIX A: OVERVIEW OF THE ANDERSON MODEL 
(2012) 
A.1 Introduction and Assumptions 
This section is a summary of Anderson (2012)’s work on modeling farmer agents. 
Following 2.5, ABSM is the best methodology to depict the heterogenetic farmers with 
different age, type, size and utility. However, they share similar behavior and accounting 
for farm businesses and expectation for the future, which makes them being plausible to 
model.  As stated in the previous section, we have three types of farmers, pure grain farmers, 
pure beef farmers and mixed farmers as they are major types in Saskatchewan.  
 
In the model, we assume that the type for farms are rigid and it will not change over time 
or during succession. Theoretically, pure grain farms occupy large scale of farmland with 
a higher return of scale on producing a crop, while pure beef farms are interested in a 
marginal land with the better productivity of beef compared with mixed farms. In farmland 
and resource bidding stage, pure grain farms will have a competitive advantage on bidding 
farmland, so as to pure beef farms on hay and marginal land. 
 
Before the optimization, all farmer agents are screened for their liquidity and pre-retirement 
conditions if they are less than fifty-five years of age.  Those who fail the initial check or 
are 55 or older will enter the second stage, tactical optimization LP model. Otherwise, 
Stage two farmers will pursue the maximization of short-time profit from production 
subtracting cost and machinery. After farmers have known the yields and prices, all farmers 
with cattle proceed to the third stage of recourse decisions and minimize ration and feeding 
costs. 
   
A.2 First Stage: The Strategic MIP 
Following Anderson (2012), in the first stage of decision making, a Mixed Integer 
Programming (MIP) model is used to make long-run decisions to determine 1) sunk costs 
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and 2) re-conversion costs. Long-run strategic decisions include 1) perennial crops, 2) 
machinery investment, 3) herd size and land acquisition.  
 
Following Schoney (2010), the long-run strategic investment decision is the following: 
 
max
𝐼0
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = −𝐼0 + 𝐵0 +∑[
𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑡 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 − 𝐹𝐿𝑡 − 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡
(1 + 𝑑)𝑡
]
𝑛
𝑡=1
+
𝑉𝑛
(1 + 𝑑)𝑛
 
  
(A.1) 
Where: dt is the real, after-tax, nominal opportunity cost of capital 
n is the planning horizon, 
Io is the investment capital outlays,  
(Land and machine are integer variables), 
Bo is the amount externally financed (borrowed), 
NOIt is the net operating income from farming activities, 
Pt is the principal payment on borrowed capital, 
Flt is the annual family living expenses, 
Rent is the total land rent of the farm, 
Rt is the net machine replacement of existing machine, purchases fewer sales and 
Vn is the ending value of all assets. 
 
A.2.1 An Overview of the Strategic MIP Model 
Anderson (2012) modified to maximize the annual equivalent by lying emphasis on actual 
cash flows. An example of a standardized matrix of MIP model without considering a 
variety of crops, land quality, technology and farm size.  
 
Since the equipment is a capital-consuming asset for the farm, it is important for the farms 
to pick up the right machine to fit their farm size to achieve cost efficiency. Moreover, 
farmers must consider potential expansion of their farms. Thus, in this stage, the machinery 
sizing problem will be another critical issue for long-run crop land use decision.  
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According to Anderson (2012), Stage-one optimization, Z1, occurs at the beginning of each 
period, namely spring. In Z1, the farmers will maximize: 
 
max𝑍1 =
𝑋,𝑇,𝐿,𝐵,𝐹𝑑,𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟:𝑄,𝑀,𝐾
𝐶𝑋 − 𝑅𝑄 − 𝑉𝑋𝑗
𝐽𝑚 − 𝐹𝐽𝑀 + 𝐶𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶∆𝐿∆𝐿 + 𝐷𝑇 − 𝐶𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑 − 𝐹𝐿𝐾
− 𝑟𝐵 
(A.2) 
Where: X is the acreage in annual, forage, crops and energy crops. 
             Q is the plot of land rented in or out, 
              is the acres of machine operation, 
             M is the acres of ownership, 
             T is the forage feeds sold or purchased, 
             L is the numbers of herd, 
             ∆L is the change of herd size, 
            Fd is the amount of feed, 
            K is the herd facility capital requirement, 
             B is total borrowing, 
             C is the annualized cost, 
             R is the rent of land, 
             V is the variable cost of machine operation, 
             FJ is the machine ownership cost, 
             CL is the herd gross margins apart from feed costs, 
             C∆L is the expansion/contraction cost, 
             D is the forage sales/ returns, 
            CFd is the feeding costs, 
            FL is the real cost of capital and 
            r is the interest rate. 
 
The MIP constraints are the following: 
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1) The total acres farmed (X) must be less than or equal to the total of all rented and 
owned land (Q+). 
 
X-Q+ ≤  Owned 
 (A.3) 
2) All annual crops require machinery system capacity. Total requirements XJj must 
be less or equal to the total operation of machines used, XJmj. It is essentially a 
transfer row. 
∑(𝑋𝑗
𝐽 − 𝑋𝑗
𝐽𝑚)
𝑛
𝑗=1 
≤ 0 
(A.4) 
3) The next equation requires that the total machine capacity actually used less than 
the total available machinery package capacity: 𝛽𝑚𝑀𝑗
𝐽𝑚
. Note that 𝑀𝑗
𝐽𝑚
 is an 
integer variable indicating the number of packages. The constraint is 
∑ (𝑋𝑗
𝐽𝑚𝑛
𝑗=1 − 𝛽
𝑚𝑀𝑗
𝐽𝑚) ≤ 0 
(A.5) 
Where: 𝛽𝑚 is the package average machine system capacity. 
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4) The total feeding consumed cannot be greater than the amount of feeding both 
purchased and produced. Moreover, more mega calories must be provided to the 
livestock than the requirement to maintain the beef herds.  
 −𝑇 + 𝐹𝑑 ≤ 0 
            (A.6) 
Where: T is the total feeding providing to the herd. 
 −𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑑 +𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑙(∆𝐿 + 𝐿) ≤ 0 
(A.7) 
  Where: Mcal(L) is the minimum requirement to maintain the beef herds. 
 
5) The change in livestock number, namely expansion of herd size related with 
acquisition cost and contraction caused by culling and selecting. It is assumed   
that the combination of contraction, expansion, and non-feed, herd operation costs  
            of the beginning, herd size is less than or equal to the current herd size. 
 
𝐿 − ∆𝐿+ + ∆𝐿− ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑤𝑠 
(A.8) 
Where: L is the initial herd size, 
             ∆𝐿+ is the increment herd, 
              ∆𝐿− is the subtracted herd and 
            Cows are the current herd size. 
 
6)  Similar to (3.2.2.5), the whole facility and labor capacity should be greater than or 
equal to the capacity needed for keeping the herd.  
−𝜕𝐾𝐿 + (∆𝐿 + 𝐿) ≤ 𝐹 
(A.9) 
Where: 𝜕 is the amount of labor, machinery and handling system to keep 300 cows and 
             F is the initial facility endowment. 
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7) For each type of the farmers, the amount of cash outflow must be less than or equal 
to the total cash stock plus net borrowing. 
𝐶𝐹 − 𝐵 ≤ 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 
(A.10) 
 
      8) The last constraint is a predetermined critical debt to asset ratio. By assuming 
rationality, farmers cannot overinvest to pass this red line. Namely,  
 𝛿(𝐼 + 𝑅 + (𝐹𝑚
𝐽𝑀𝑚
𝐽 )  + 𝐿 + 𝐹𝐿𝐾𝐿) + 𝐵 ≤ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 
(A.11) 
Where: 𝛿 is the critical debt to asset ratio, 
             I is the initial investment on energy crop,  
R is the payment of farmland rent, 
FJ is the cost of machine, 
𝑀𝑚
𝐽
  is the number of machine units, 
FL is the fixed costs of the beef cow machinery, handling and labor, 
KL is the number of beef cow machinery, handling and labor and 
Equity is the total equity a farm has.   
 
A. 2.2 Second-Stage (Tactical LP) 
The second-stage decision, Z2 is a tactical decision process to make only short-term profit 
maximization without taking expansion into account. The Second-Stage Tactical LP is 
based on farmers’ expectation of future yields and crop prices.  
 
max
X
Z2 =𝐶𝑋𝑗
𝐽𝑚
 
(A.12) 
Subject to: 
 𝑋𝑗
𝐽𝑚 ≤ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 
(A.13) 
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A.2.3 Third Stage (Recourse LP) 
The third stage, Z3, is about livestock feeding problem. Feeding cost is supposed to 
minimize the feeding cost subject to the herd nutrient requirement, which is determined by 
the trade-off between purchasing hay and feeds and produce them internally. However, 
extreme conditions such as adverse weather may both decrease the productivity of feeds 
and rocket the price, thus generate a negative impact on farm cash flow. The Stage Three 
LP problem is:   
 
 max
𝑡,𝐹𝑑
𝑧3 =𝐷𝑇 − 𝐶𝐹𝑑𝐹𝑑 
(A.14) 
Subject To:   
 −𝑇 + 𝐹𝑑 ≤ 0 
(A.15) 
 −𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑑 ≤ 𝑀𝑐𝑎𝑙(∆𝐿 + 𝐿) 
(A.16) 
 
The maximization problem is subject to the feeding transfer constraint as shown in the 
previous section.   
 
A.2.4 Farmer Agent Business Accounts 
Anderson (2012) generated some methodologies to calculate the financial situation, which 
will also be inherited and applied in this paper. At the end of the year, we achieve the actual 
production and each farmer agent calculates their total gross income and total expenses, 
including debt repayments for the year for all enterprises of the farm.  This section presents 
the year-end structural accounting equations and other business related activities of the 
farmer agent.  The following diagram (Figure 3.2) shows how the three stages and all the 
business related accounts interact in the model.     
 
In the following section, subscripts are used to denote activity or enterprises use or 
affiliation. 
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A.2.4.1 Gross Farm Accounting Income 
Total gross farm income includes gross income from sales of annual crops (GIAC), calves 
and cull cows GILS, hay sales (GIH), energy crops (GIEC) and stabilization programs (GPIS).   
𝑇𝐺𝐼 =  𝐺𝐼𝐴𝐶 + 𝐺𝐼𝐿𝑆 + 𝐺𝐼𝐻 + 𝐺𝐼𝐸𝐶 + 𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑆 
 (A.17) 
Gross income generated from annual crop production is calculated using the stochastic 
yield (bu/acre), and stochastic prices ($/bu) for each annual crop sowed based on total 
harvested acres.   
 𝐺𝐼𝐴𝐶 = 𝑌𝐶𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑗 
 (A.18) 
Where: Ycj is actual yield per acre of crop j. 
Pcj is current price of crop j and 
Acrescj is acres of crop j. 
 
The gross income generated from beef cows comes from the annual sale of the calf crop 
and any cull cows sold off and replaced during the year.  However, the gross income is 
based on an average weight per calf of 495 pounds14.  This is then multiplied by the current 
market price per calf multiplied by the size of the herd.  For pure annual crop farms that 
produce hay, their income from performing this activity is calculated here. 
 𝐺𝐼𝐿𝑆 = 495𝑙𝑏𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑓 ∗ 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
 (A.19) 
 𝐺𝐼𝐻 = 𝑇ℎ𝑖 ∗  𝑃𝑡ℎ 
 (A.20) 
Where: 495lbs is weighted average of beef cows sold in pounds, 
Pcalf is average price of beef cows sold, 
HerdSize is total herd size of the farmer, 
Thi is total tons of hay (improved baled or hayland baled) and 
Pth is the current price per ton based on the local forage market. 
                                                 
14 The Western Beef Development Center estimated average weaning weights of 523 and 565 pounds in 2003 
and 2006 respectively for an average of 550 pounds per calf.  Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food (1999) 
estimate a 10% death loss bringing the average calf weight to 495 pounds.   
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Not all energy crops produce the same yearly return as their return varies across their life-
cycle.  However, if it is a harvest year, gross income is calculated in the same manner as 
annual crop production.     
 𝐺𝐼𝐸𝐶 = 𝑌𝑒𝑐𝑖 ∗  𝑃𝑒𝑐𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑖 
  (A.21) 
Where: Yeci is total yield of energy biomass crop i in oven-dried tones, 
Peci is price per oven-dried ton of biomass crop I and 
Acreseci is the total acres of energy crop i harvested this year 
 
A.2.4.2 Total Farm Accounting Expenses 
Total farm expenses include all the farm operations including annual cropping, beef cows 
and energy crop enterprises as well as interest payments and hired custom work15.  Fixed 
costs related to each farm enterprise include the debt payment portion of the fixed cost as 
well as the allowable depreciation expense.   
 𝑇𝐹𝐸 = 𝐴𝐶𝑒 + 𝐿𝑒 + 𝐸𝐶𝑒 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝐹𝐴 + 𝐷𝑝 + 𝐶𝑤 
 (A.22) 
Where: TFE is total farm expenses, 
ACe is total annual cropping expenses, 
Le is total beef cow expenses, 
ECe is total energy crop expenses, 
DeprFA is related depreciation expense on all depreciable farm assets, 
Dp is interest on debt and 
Cw is total expense of custom work hired out. 
 
The total expenditures related to annual cropping include variable costs per acre, operating 
variable costs per acre of machinery, variable cost per ton to account for miscellaneous 
costs including transportation and freight charges of each crop as well as the lease rate per 
acre of any rented cropland.   The annual cropping expenses become: 
                                                 
15 The other component of debt service, principal payment is a cash outflow however. 
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 𝐴𝐶𝑒 = 𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑗 + 𝑉𝐶𝑚𝑗 ∗  𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑗 + 𝑇𝑐𝑗 ∗  𝑉𝐶𝑡𝑐𝑗 + 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑙 ∗ 𝑟𝑙 
 (A.23) 
Where: VCcj is the variable cost per acre for annual crop j, 
Acresj is the total acres sowed of annual crop j, 
VCmj is the variable cost per acre for machine option j, 
Acresmj is the total annual crop acres used by machine option j, 
Tcj is the total tons of annual crop j produced, 
VCtcj is the Variable Cost per ton of annual crop j, 
Acresl is the total annual crop acres leased and 
rl is the rental rate of cropland rented in. 
 
Beef cow expenses include all expenditures related to beef cow and forage production 
related activities.  However, this excludes the cost of breaking land for forage production. 
  𝐿𝑒 = 𝑉𝐶𝑝𝑖  ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑃𝑖 + 𝑉𝐶𝑏𝑖 ∗  𝐴𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝑛𝑐 ∗ 𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑤 + 𝑛𝑐𝑙 ∗  𝐹𝐶𝑙 + 𝐴𝑐𝑙 ∗ 𝑟𝑙 + 𝑇ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑡ℎ 
 + 𝑇ℎ𝑖 ∗  𝑉𝐶𝑡 
 (A.24) 
Where: VCpi is the variable cost per acre associated with pasture type I, 
Acpi is the total acres of pasture I, 
VCbi is the baling variable cost per acre of pasture type I, 
Achi is the total acres of hay production from pasture I, 
nc is the total herd size, 
VCcow is the variable cost per cow, 
ncl is the number of full-time cow laborers required, 
FCcl is the fixed cost per full-time cow laborer of $9,000, 
Acl is the total annual crop acres leased, 
rl is the rental rate of cropland rented in, 
Thi is total tons of hay (improved baled or hayland baled), 
Pth is the current price per ton based on the local forage market and 
VCt is the variable cost per ton of hay. 
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A.2.4.3 Government Programs  
An essential component of analyzing the structural change in agriculture and the 
competitiveness of new farm enterprises with existing ones are the government programs 
available to farmers.  Government programs or farm safety nets are triggered when farm 
agents suffer from low farm income and poor yields.  The government programs used in 
this model follow the basic rules of Crop insurance, AgriStability and AgriInvest, and we 
simplify the procedure for ease of modeling. The crop insurance, AgriStability and 
AgriInvest sections of this thesis have been adopted from additions Stolniuk (2008) made 
to his NetLogo© model entitled “Model Additions After Thesis” (2008b).  Government 
programs influence farmers’ expectations and their ability to compete in the marketplace.  
This section outlines the various government programs used in the simulation.   
 
A.2.4.4 Crop Insurance 
Poor yields will trigger crop insurance payouts to farm agents with crop insurance 
coverage.  A farmer’s total crop insurance premium is a part of their variable expenses for 
each particular annual crop depending on coverage level.  These premiums are based on 
reference values from each farmer agent’s level of coverage and historical yields from 
previous years (Stolniuk 2008b).  Crop insurance payouts are also based on each 
producer’s level of coverage.  The farmer agent’s expected yield builds upon the weighted 
average of their previous five-year crop data.   The standard of coverage for each farm is 
assigned randomly according to the following generated by Stolniuk (2008b) 1) 4.4% of 
farmers having no coverage, 2) 13.6% of farmers having 60%, 3) 34.1% of farmers having 
70% and 4) the remaining 47.9% of farmers having 80% coverage.  For modeling 
simplicity, this level of coverage is set at initialization and thus remains constant during 
the entire simulation period.   
 
Each farm agent calculates their total premium paid according to the total liability 
encountered by crop insurance for each crop.  Total liability is the expected insurance crop 
yield, historical yield index, insurance coverage level of the farmer and the current market 
price of the commodity.  Total liability is on a per acre basis for each crop.   
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𝑇𝐿𝑗 = 𝐼𝑌𝑗 ∗  𝑄𝐼𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑗 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 
(A.25) 
Where: TLj is the total liability for crop j on the plot, 
IYj is the insurance expected yield for crop j, 
QIj is the yield index for crop j on the plot, 
Pj is the current market price of crop j and 
IC is the insurance coverage of the farmer currently farming the plot. 
 
The total premium per acre is then the total liability multiplied by the premium calculated 
for that specific crop based on the level of coverage of the farmer.  Following Stolniuk 
(2008b), we calculate the premium for each crop and coverage level using historical price 
and yield data to the CAR. The premiums will result in the long-run goal for crop insurance 
of breaking even, assuming that the producers pay 40% of the premiums, and the 
government pays the rest 60% (SCIC 2012). 
T𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑡 =∑𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑃𝑅𝑗
7
𝑗=1
 
(A.26) 
Where: TPPlot is the total premium of the plot and 
PRj is the premium for crop j based on the coverage level of the current farmer 
 
The total premium paid by the farmer agent is then the sum of all crop acres in their control 
(Stolniuk 2008b). We calculate total crop insurance payout for each plot and then the 
farmer sums all the plots in their control.  To calculate if a farmer agent is eligible for a 
crop insurance payout, the farmer agent determines the total insured production for the plot 
of each commodity.   
   𝐼𝑆𝑗 = 𝐼𝑌𝑗 ∗ 𝐼𝐶 ∗ 𝑄𝐼𝑗 
 (A.27) 
Where: ISj is the insured production of crop j for the plot. 
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Once the actual yield is known, we subtract actual yield from the insured yield, multiplied 
by the current market price as well as total crop acres of that crop.  If the payout is negative, 
there will be no payment .  However, if the calculation is positive, farmer will receive a 
payout from crop insurance.   
 𝐶𝐼𝑃𝐶𝑗 = ∑ (𝐼𝑆𝑗 − 𝐴𝑃𝑗) ∗ 𝑃𝑗 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝐶𝑗
7
𝑗=1  
 (A.28) 
Where: CIPcj is the total crop insurance payment for crop j on the plot and 
APj is the actual production of the crop on the plot. 
 
A.2.4.5 Net Cash Flows  
Monitoring cash flows in farming are necessary because the industry is extremely capital 
intensive.  Therefore it is essential that farmers maintain positive cash flows including 
enough to cover income taxes and the minimum family living withdrawal.  Net cash flow 
is as follow: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑁𝐹𝐼 + 𝑂𝐹𝐼 − 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 
 (A.29) 
Where: OFI is off-farm employment income of the farm family, 
IncomeTaxes is the amount of income taxes paid and 
FamilyLiving is the family living withdrawal. 
 
A.2.4.6 Income Taxes 
After we deduct the total farm expenses from the total gross income, we will achieve net 
farm income and add to farmer cash account. Also, the farmer will pay income taxes from 
the net farm income amount.  For model simplicity, the income tax rate is constantly 20%.16  
Income taxes paid is deductible from each farmer’s cash account.  Thus, the income tax 
calculation is as follows: 
 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = 𝑁𝐹𝐼 ∗  𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
                                                 
16  The income tax rate is based upon a weighted average of the small business tax corporate rate for 
Saskatchewan of 2 % and the regular rate of 12 % (CRA 2015) and the 2008 federal small business corporate 
tax rate of 11 % and regular rates of 15 % which stated to implement from January 2015 (CRA 2015) thus a 
simplified 18 % rate is used. 
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 (A.30) 
Where: TaxIncome is the amount of income tax paid by farmer I, 
NFI is the net farm income of the farmer and 
TaxRate is the total income tax rate.  
 
After deducting the income tax, we add off-farm employment income to the cash account.  
Off-farm income does not have income tax deducted from it since we assume it is 
deductible.  We generate off-farm income by a probability factor at model initialization.  
Smaller farms have a higher probability for off-farm income than larger farms.  Finally, we 
subtract family living costs from the remaining cash flow.   
 
A.2.4.7 Non-Land Asset Valuation  
Capital farm assets including annual cropping machinery, beef cow machinery and beef 
cow handling systems depreciates following the same method used by Stolniuk (2008).  
This depreciation method allows the remaining capital value to depreciate at a constant rate 
except for 50% of the capital value following the first year rule.  Based on Schoney (1980) 
the estimated parameter of 0.948 uses a larger depreciable amount in the first year assuming 
new machinery.  According to the following formula, the current market value is: 
 𝑉𝑛 = 𝑉0 ∗ 0.948 ∗  0.901
𝑛 
(A.31) 
Where: Vn is the capital asset value at n years, 
V0 is the new capital asset value and 
n is the years of the capital asset value. 
 
A.2.4.8 Family Living Withdrawals 
There is a minimum family living expense that must be deducted from cash each year to 
cover basic family living requirements of the farm family.  However, following Stolniuk 
(2008) farm families also have an increasing propensity to consume.  The farmers 
increasing the propensity to consume a portion of the profits is built into the simulation as 
well.  Therefore the living expense deducted is the larger value of either the minimum 
family withdrawal amount or the propensity to consume.   However, propensity to consume 
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farm profits eventually diminishes and an upper bound is placed on family living 
withdrawal.  The remainder of farm profits is reinvested back into the farm.     The family 
living expense is as follows: 
 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑀a𝑥(𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝛿𝑁𝐹𝐼) 
 (A.32) 
Where: Fammin is the minimum family living withdrawal, 
δ is the propensity to consume farm profits and 
NFI is the net farm income or retained earnings before new investments. 
 
A.2.4.9 Balance Sheet 
As in any business entity, balance sheets must be updated and maintained to track changes 
in owners net worth and liabilities of the farm.   The balance sheet in this model includes 
changes in asset values such as land value, inventory value of cows, capital, cash flows as 
well as the farmer’s remaining debt.  Total farmer’s equity is: 
 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ =  ∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑡=1 − ∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1   
 (A.33) 
The land value of each farmer is calculated using the current market price of land times the 
average land quality divided by the average productivity rating multiplied by total acres 
owned.  Capital value includes the annual crop machinery options and the beef cow 
equipment and handling system of each farmer.  Capital values are updated yearly to reflect 
new purchases, sales of old capital as well as the loss in depreciation.  Total beef cow value 
is calculated as the herd size times the price of a cow multiplied by an average cow weight 
of 1300 lbs. The calculation of total assets is:  
∑ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛𝑡=1  = 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑞 +  𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐶𝑜𝑤𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  
 (A.34) 
Where: 
 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =
𝑃𝐿∗𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑
    
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑞 = 𝑀𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑐 + 𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑞𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒     
𝐶𝑜𝑤𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑤𝑠 ∗  𝑃𝑐𝑜𝑤 ∗ 1300𝑙𝑏𝑠   
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Total debt of each farm agent is updated each period to reflect new debt taken on during 
the year as well as any old debt that has been reduced through principal payments. Updated 
debt is calculated as the following: 
∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑛𝑡=1  = 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑑 +𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑦  
 (A.35) 
Where: DebtOld is any previously held debt, 
DebtNew is any newly obtained debt and 
PrincipalPay is the principal payment made on old debt. 
  
 150 
 
1
5
0
 
APPENDIX B: FARM SUCCESSION QUESTIONNAIRE 
RESULTS 
Table B.1 Regression Results, Farmland Succession Questionnaire 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Owned Acres/ Total Acres 0.02 0.03 -0.90 
Log(Land) 0.06 0.07 0.80 
Gender** (0 = Male) -0.15 0.07 -2.25 
Income -0.05 0.11 -0.42 
Type*** (1 = Pure grain farm, 2 = Pure beef 
farm and 3 = Mixed farm 
-0.23 0.07 -3.26 
Constant 0.68 0.30 2.23 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.23 F-statistic*** 4.75 
 
The result from the regression at least partially validates the previous literature. Initially, 
the signs appear as expected. Farms with more land owned, a male heir, higher off-farm 
income, and pure grain type possess a higher likelihood of succession, with a basic 
succession probability of 0.678. However, we note that 3 out of 6 coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Apart from possible sample bias and a limited number of 
respondents, the targeted respondents for the survey measures student intentions to operate 
their family farms rather the intentions of more senior farm operators, the latter of whom 
must have a greater influence on forming succession plans. In effect at the time of the 
survey, these students might not have made up their minds yet over future career goals, 
rendering the data potentially less reliable.  
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APPENDIX C: AN EXAMPLE OF PORTFOLIO 
CONSTRUCTION AND FARMLAND VALUATION 
In the model, institutional investors can invest in risk-free bonds (three-month bond from 
the Bank of Canada), farmland and international stock indices. For a clearer exposition of 
this specification, we construct an example to show the detailed steps. In the example, the 
investor attempts to construct optimal portfolio bundles. The investor initially computes 
beta and uses the beta value along with CAPM to determine their bidding price for farmland, 
considering future capital gains and land rents.   
 
Risk-free bonds and nine international stock indices such as the Dow Jones and TXS are 
available to the investor. Here, we construct hypothetical portfolios from 1978 to 2013 in 
Table 1. 
 
Table C.1: Example of an Optimal Portfolio 
 
The next step is to calculate the beta value and reserve bidding prices for farmland by using 
historical rents and capital gains of a CAR1 plot. The results and associated investment 
decisions are presented in Table 2. 
 
Indices US Hongkong Japan UK Germany France Spain Canada Australia Risk-free
Proportion 23.22% 57.02% 0.00% 19.75% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
3.22% 3.93% 2.57% 2.96% 3.23% 2.79% 2.46% 2.67% 2.85% 0.03%
3.93% 16.95% 6.27% 5.58% 3.56% 4.20% 4.59% 5.58% 6.52% -0.01%
2.57% 6.27% 6.79% 2.68% 3.40% 2.80% 3.30% 2.77% 2.83% -0.12%
2.96% 5.58% 2.68% 6.69% 4.29% 3.46% 2.87% 3.02% 4.76% -0.04%
3.23% 3.56% 3.40% 4.29% 8.80% 5.84% 4.53% 2.93% 3.89% 0.01%
2.79% 4.20% 2.80% 3.46% 5.84% 5.84% 4.13% 3.20% 4.39% 0.06%
2.46% 4.59% 3.30% 2.87% 4.53% 4.13% 7.27% 2.61% 3.63% 0.09%
2.67% 5.58% 2.77% 3.02% 2.93% 3.20% 2.61% 4.43% 4.04% -0.10%
2.85% 6.52% 2.83% 4.76% 3.89% 4.39% 3.63% 4.04% 7.02% -0.05%
0.03% -0.01% -0.12% -0.04% 0.01% 0.06% 0.09% -0.10% -0.05% 0.09%
Averag Excess Return 2.64% 8.61% -0.58% 3.83% 0.06% 2.14% 2.76% 2.50% 1.91% 2.16%
Var-Cov Matrix
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Table C.2: Beta and Bidding Prices from 1986 to 2013 
 
 
Looking at Table 3.4, the beta values for all 27 years are negative, implying the strong risk 
diversification function of farmland due to the negative covariance. Moreover, as the PV 
is based on farmer bidding value in the remaining few years, as mentioned the introduction 
of maximum bidding prices for land protects investors from bidding too high. 
 
Interestingly, the negative beta value of farmland is a strong indication of the negative 
correlation between the returns of a market portfolio and farmland. As mentioned in 
Section 3.1, in the model simulation we only consider three different investors regarding 
their choices of assets. As a result, the only element that distinguishes their bidding price 
is the scope of asset selection.  
Year Variance Beta Return PV Investor's Bid Farmers' Bid Decision
1987 0.13 -0.02 45.72 585.53 585.53 339.92 Buy
1988 0.12 -0.02 39.58 439.00 439.00 326.23 Buy
1989 0.12 -0.02 32.45 281.54 281.54 326.23 Don't Buy
1990 0.11 -0.02 26.00 211.29 211.29 323.95 Don't Buy
1991 0.11 -0.02 20.29 242.46 242.46 302.28 Don't Buy
1992 0.10 -0.03 8.24 133.37 133.37 290.87 Don't Buy
1993 0.11 -0.02 -0.05 -1.13 -1.13 288.59 Don't Buy
1994 0.11 -0.02 -4.68 -94.78 -94.78 309.12 Don't Buy
1995 0.11 -0.02 -3.18 -49.26 -49.26 341.06 Don't Buy
1996 0.10 -0.03 1.12 30.75 30.75 358.17 Don't Buy
1997 0.10 -0.03 9.26 339.88 339.88 375.28 Don't Buy
1998 0.10 -0.03 14.51 340.42 340.42 424.80 Don't Buy
1999 0.10 -0.03 21.17 461.56 461.56 392.64 Buy
2000 0.10 -0.03 27.90 554.66 554.66 378.21 Buy
2001 0.10 -0.03 25.70 731.55 729.68 418.31 Buy
2002 0.10 -0.03 26.22 1013.52 789.46 451.30 Buy
2003 0.10 -0.03 33.83 1138.67 752.21 451.31 Buy
2004 0.10 -0.03 37.96 1827.52 728.67 417.19 Buy
2005 0.09 -0.03 37.40 1407.52 674.61 410.03 Buy
2006 0.09 -0.03 31.08 817.39 712.65 428.80 Buy
2007 0.09 -0.03 26.70 740.07 687.39 552.46 Buy
2008 0.10 -0.03 29.15 1811.10 1028.65 565.42 Buy
2009 0.10 -0.03 41.84 58964.23 1123.75 661.61 Buy
2010 0.09 -0.03 40.49 18617.91 1062.40 783.07 Buy
2011 0.09 -0.03 55.38 12370.52 1494.15 1138.84 Buy
2012 0.09 -0.03 67.07 9244.35 1840.67 1502.62 Buy
2013 0.09 -0.03 100.67 13222.94 2597.02 1624.62 Buy
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APPENDIX D: UPDATED SYSTEMATIC MODEL INPUTS 
Following Anderson (2012) and Stolniuk (2008), the real values of cost for machinery, 
variable cost for grain and beef production are fixed over the simulation period. In this 
model, these values were updated based on the rate of inflation. The updated values of 
these systematic parameters are shown in Tables 1 to 6. Values for other parameters in 
the model are the same as in Anderson (2012). 
 
Table D.1: Systematic Parameters of Cropping Machinery 
Item
Machinery 
Option
Value Item
Machinery 
Option
Value
Option 0 119         Option 0 10.6       
Option 1 487         Option 1 52.7       
Option 2 944         Option 2 130        
Option 3 1,410      Option 3 204        
Option 4 1,827      Option 4 256        
Option 5 3,654      Option 5 481        
Option 6 4,938      Option 6 619        
Option 7 6,850      Option 7 875        
Option 8 8,929      Option 8 1,093     
Option 9 10,641    Option 9 1,328     
Option 0 512         Option 0 78.0       
Option 1 1,593      Option 1 21.5       
Option 2 2,002      Option 2 15.9       
Option 3 2,457      Option 3 14.5       
Option 4 2,675      Option 4 12.7       
Option 5 4,331      Option 5 14.1       
Option 6 5,673      Option 6 14.9       
Option 7 7,863      Option 7 13.7       
Option 8 10,089    Option 8 14.1       
Option 9 12,005    Option 9 13.7       
Machin
ery 
Value in 
Model 
Initiation 
Phase 
($1,000
)
Price 
for New 
Machin
ery 
($1,000
)
Annual 
Fixed 
Cost 
($1,000)
Variable 
Cost ($)
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Table 3: Systematic Parameters of Repairs of Cropping Machinery 
Machinery 
Option
Value 
($/Acre)
Option 0 8.54
Option 1 7.56
Option 2 5.91
Option 3 4.87
Option 4 4.19
Option 5 3.30
Option 6 3.53
Option 7 3.74
Option 8 4.11
Option 9 4.37
 
 
Table D.3: Systematic Parameters of Beef Cow Handling Machinery 
Item Value ($)
Fixed cost for cow handling 2,832     
Fixed cost for cow machinery 14,910   
Investment for cow machine 192,616 
Investment for cow handling 36,829   
 
 
Table D.4: Variable Cost of Grain Production 
Item
Type of 
Product
Traditional Non Till
Barley 81.6 84.8
Canola 128 136
Wheat 85.0 88.2
Lentils 95.8 95.8
Peas 85.4 89.6
Flax 72.3 75.2
Durum 85.0 88.2
0.26 0.26
Variable Cost per 
Tonne ($/Tonne)
Variable 
Cost per 
Acre 
($/Acre)
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Table D.5: Variable Cost of Fallow, Hay Production and Beef Cow Production 
 
Category Item Type of Product Value
Wheat Fallow 71.1
Summer Fallow 13.5
Bale IP1 13.4
Bale IP2 20.1
Hay IP1 23.4
Hay IP2 30.1
Natural Hayland 6.98
IP 1.58
Feed Grain 10.9
Feed Hay 11.2
Straw Bale 13.4
11750Cow Labor ($/Year)
Fallow
Hay 
Production
Beef Cow 
Production
Variable 
Cost per 
Tonne 
Variable 
Cost per 
Acre 
($/Acre)
Variable 
Cost per 
Acre 
($/Acre)
 
Table D.6: Parameters of Farm Family Living, Wage Labor and Land Price Basis 
 
Category Item Value
Maximum 141,070
Minimum 29,600
93.0        
Farmland Price 1,526      
Pasture Land 1,049      
Farmland Rent 57.2        
Pasture Land Rent 39.3        
Labor Wage ($)
Land Price 
Basis ($/Acre)
Family Living 
Withdraw 
($/Year)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 156 
 
1
5
6
 
APPENDIX E: WILLINGNESS TO FARM OPINION 
QUESTIONNAIRE/SURVEY17,18 
“Willingness to Farm” Opinion Survey 
Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics 
University of Saskatchewan 
 
Researcher: 
Chi Su, MSc candidate, 
51 Campus Dr. Saskatoon, S7N 5A8, (306) 966-4043 
 
Supervisors: 
James Nolan, Professor (306) 966-8412 
Dr. Richard Schoney, Professor Emeritus (306) 966-4018 
51 Campus Dr. Saskatoon, S7N 5A8,  
 
We are very interested in the future business health of Saskatchewan agriculture. I am currently 
working on an agent based model to project the structure of grain farms over the next 30 years 
under various scenarios. One of the most important factors affecting the health of our industry is 
the willingness of good young people to enter agriculture.  I would like your opinions about your 
high school and college friends that grow up in a rural setting as to their willingness to start farming. 
 
We have identified two major factors affecting the willingness of farm kids to return to their farm. 
1) the relative income farming can provide in relation to off-farm income and 2) spousal willingness 
to adapt a farming lifestyle and 3) farm status. 
 
Because we cannot be certain about values, we would like you to indicate the most likely value 
(“best guess) and then a range of values. 
 
Filling out this Survey: 
In filling out this survey, we would like you to indicate your “best guess” with an “X.”  Next, we 
would like for you to indicate the range of values that you feel that you would be 95% certain 
contain the true value.  As an example, consider two options, Not A (will not be willing to farm) 
and A (willing to farm).   
 
  
                                                 
17 The University Committee for Ethics in Human Research (UCEHR) was contacted and they determined 
that the survey did fall within their purview and hence, did not require their approval.  This was because of 
the nature of the questions: the students were asked about their opinions as to the likely response of their 
farm peers, and do not constitute responses about themselves. Accordingly, they are exempt from the policies 
of UCEHR.  
18 This survey has been altered slightly from the original due to reformatting and the correction of a few typos. 
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(a) If you are highly certain that A is unlikely to happen, then you would put an X on the far left-
hand side. 
               
  X                        
0% 
A             
100% 
A 
  A will NOT happen MIGHT Happen  A will happen   
 
(b) If you think that A might happen, then you would put an X in the middle, with a line indicating 
a range of values that you think are reasonable. 
               
           X             
0% 
A             
100% 
A 
  A will NOT happen MIGHT Happen A will happen  
 
 Your responses are strictly confidential and will be used only for statistical purposes. 
 
Gender :  ____ Male  ____Female        
You come from (check one):  ____ Mixed Farm (Beef & Grain) _____ Straight Grain Farm     
_____Other farm type   _____ Not a Farm 
  
1a. What % of farm kids do you think will not consider farming under any conditions? 
               
                          
0%             100% 
 
1b. What % of farm kids do you think will consider farming under any conditions?  
               
                          
0%             100% 
 
2. Of those that come from a mixed (Grain and Beef Cow) farm, what % will not consider 
mixed (Grain and Beef) farming under any conditions?  
               
                          
0%             100% 
 
3. Of those that come from a mixed (Grain and Beef Cow) farm, what % will not consider 
straight grain farming under any condition?  
               
                          
0%             100% 
 
4. Of those that come from a straight grain farm (i.e.,. with no livestock), what % will not 
consider mixed (Crop and Beef) farming under any condition?  
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0%             100% 
 
5. Of those that come from a straight grain farm (i.e.,. with no livestock), what % will not 
consider straight farming under any condition?  
               
                          
0%             100% 
 
Questions 6, 7 and 8 are for those kids who come from mixed (grain and 
beef) farms: 
 
6. If they can make $35,000 from off-farm employment, what is the minimum % of that 
income would they need from the farm before they would farm? 
                
                           
0%              100% 
 
7. If they can make $50,000 from off-farm employment, what is the minimum % of that 
income would they need from the farm before they would farm? 
               
                          
0%             100% 
 
8. If they can make $65,000 from off-farm employment, what is the minimum % of that 
income would they need from the farm before they would farm? 
               
                          
              
 
Question 9, 10 and 11 are for those who come from straight grain farms: 
 
9. If they can make $35,000 from off-farm employment, what is the minimum % of that 
income would they need from the farm before they would farm? 
               
                          
0%             100% 
 
10. If they can make $50,000 from off-farm employment, what is the minimum % of that 
income would they need from the farm before they would farm? 
               
                          
0%             100% 
 
  
 0%                                                                                                                             100% 
 159 
 
1
5
9
 
11. If they can make $65,000 from off-farm employment, what is the minimum % of that 
income would they need from the farm before they would farm? 
               
                          
0%             100% 
 
12. How important to your friends is find a potential spouse that is willing to adapt a farm 
lifestyle if they do decide farm? 
               
                          
0%             100% 
 
13. How many acres of tillable acres does your family currently farm? _____ 
14 What is the proportion of land is owned by your family (instead of rented)? _____ 
15. If you have beef cows, how many heads does your family currently have? _____ 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey, if you have any additional 
comments please feel free to provide them on the rest of this page. 
 
